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Principled Consequentialism
Abstract
This Article characterizes and seeks to reconcile two competing approaches to legal
reasoning, through the lens of the problem of the determinacy of legal doctrine. On the
“neo-formalist” approach, characteristic of many modern liberal scholars, the appropriate
doctrinal answer to any legal problem can be determined by working out, in a quasideductive way and in isolation from consequentialist considerations, the implications of a
small and stable set of legal principles. On the “neo-realist” approach, characteristic of
many economic analysts of law but also of certain leftist critics of liberalism, principles
provide no determinate answer to legal problems; the only way to decide on the
appropriate legal doctrine is to ask about the effects of adopting that doctrine on some
favored value. The Article accepts the neo-realist claim that doctrine is indeterminate,
but also accepts the neo-formalist claim that principles matter. It is argued that legal
reasoning can, and should, follow a method of “principled consequentialism”. That is,
legal decision-makers can use legal principles to establish a range of acceptable legal
doctrines, and can then consider the consequential effects of those doctrines in choosing
among them. The possibility and desirability of understanding legal reasoning as a form
of principled consequentialism is illustrated through an examination of several specific
legal doctrines, in particular, the problem of choosing appropriate standards of fault for
criminal liability.
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Principled Consequentialism

I.

INTRODUCTION

At least since the days of the early legal realists, it has been persuasively argued that the
abstract normative principles that the law seeks to express cannot determine particular
legal doctrines.1 The claim that legal principles do not determine doctrine has several
contemporary forms, including the skeptical or neo-Nietzschean2 effort to unmask law’s
1

Realist texts emphasizing this point include Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of

the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167 (1920); Robert Hale, Coercion and
Distribution in a Supposedly Non-coercive State, 38 POL.SCI.Q. 470 (1923) (book
review); Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35
COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935); Karl Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence—The Next Step,
30 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (1930); KARL LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY
AND PRACTICE

(1962). For an illuminating analysis of the various strands of Realist

thought, see Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151,
1219-1259 (1985), see also Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV.
465 (1988) (book review).
2

I adopt this term from CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF 99-103 (1989).

“Neo-Nietzschean thinkers have ... tried to show how various forms of social exclusion
and domination are built into the very definitions by which a hypergood perspective is
constituted ...” Id. at 71. (Taylor defines “hypergoods” as “goods which not only are
incomparably more important than others but provide the standpoint from which these must
be weighed, judged, decided about.” Id. at 63.) The exemplary neo-Nietzschean among
contemporary legal theorists is perhaps Stanley Fish. While he shares many of the

2
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pretensions to neutrality, equality, and principle,3 the leftist vision of a legal order free
from domination and exploitation,4 the pragmatic rejection of the idea that legal doctrine
derives directly from principle,5 and the legal economists’ attempt to render legal

Critical Legal Scholars’ attitudes, and can carry out a Critical unmasking of liberal legal
doctrine with unsurpassed verve and clarity, he stands apart from the Critics in an
important respect: he insists that what replaces the liberal legal mask is always another
mask. See, for example, STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY 315-467
(1989); STANLEY FISH, THERE’S NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH … AND IT’S A GOOD
THING, TOO 141-230 (1994) [hereinafter FISH, FREE SPEECH]. Compare FRIEDRICH
NIETZSCHE, BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL §4 (1886) (Walter Kaufman trans. 1966): “To
recognize untruth as a condition of life—that certainly means resisting accustomed value
feelings in a dangerous way; and a philosophy that risks this would by that token alone
place itself beyond good and evil.”
3

DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (FIN DE SIÈCLE) (1997)

[hereinafter KENNEDY, CRITIQUE); PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON
(1998) [hereinafter SCHLAG, ENCHANTMENT); STANLEY FISH, THE TROUBLE WITH
PRINCIPLE (1999) [hereinafter FISH, PRINCIPLE].
4

See ROBERTO UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME? (1996)

[hereinafter UNGER, LEGAL ANALYSIS].
5

JULES COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE 5-6 (2001) [hereinafter COLEMAN,

PRACTICE]; Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, in PRAGMATISM IN
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doctrine determinate by invoking the concept of economic efficiency.6 The realist or
critical claim that doctrine is indeterminate might seem to be so well established, or at
least so frequently argued for, that there is no purpose in making it again. But under the
influence of what I will call the neo-formalism of late 20th-century liberal political and
legal theory,7 the claim that doctrine is determinate has not lacked defenders.8 Indeed,

LAW AND SOCIETY 127 (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991) [hereinafter Radin,
Pragmatist]; Thomas C. Grey, What Good is Legal Pragmatism?, in PRAGMATISM IN
LAW AND SOCIETY 9 (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991).
6

See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 353-92 (1990)

[hereinafter POSNER, PROBLEMS]; LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS
WELFARE (2002).
7

See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed. 1999) [hereinafter RAWLS,

JUSTICE]; JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (paperback ed. 1996) [hereinafter
RAWLS, LIBERALISM]; RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (paperback ed.
1978) [hereinafter DWORKIN, RIGHTS]; RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE
(1985) [hereinafter DWORKIN, PRINCIPLE]; RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986);
RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW (1996); BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE
LIBERAL STATE (1980); ERNEST WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1995); ALAN
BRUDNER, THE UNITY OF THE COMMON LAW (1995) [hereinafter BRUDNER, UNITY]
ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LAW (1999) [hereinafter
RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY]. The theorists I identify as “neo-formalists” correspond roughly to
those whom Ian Shapiro calls “neo-Kantian”: see IAN SHAPIRO, POLITICAL CRITICISM 3-

4
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Ronald Dworkin’s claim that there is a right answer in every case, no matter how hard or
politically charged the case appears to be, puts the claim for determinacy as high as it can
go.9
The stakes in this debate are high. For some neo-formalists, the determinacy of
doctrine is intimately connected with the distinction between law and politics. They fear

11 (1990). I use the terms “neo-formalism” to highlight two related attributes of this kind
of argument: (1) the rejection of realism and positivism as ways of understanding the
law’s functions and origins; and (2) the quasi-deductive method of working from
principles to doctrines and then to particular results in cases.
The inclusion of Dworkin among the neo-formalists may seem odd in light of his
commitment to an interpretive understanding of law. But his equally important
commitments to right answers and to a certain form of principled argument are quite
formalist, perhaps even Kantian. See James Boyle, Anachronism of the Moral
Sentiments? Integrity, Postmodernism, and Justice, 51 STANFORD L. REV. 493, 502-510
(1999); SCHLAG, ENCHANTMENT, supra note 3, at 68.
8

The neo-formalist claim that doctrine flows in a reasonably determinate manner

from principled legal argument typically does not extend to the stronger claim that the
results of particular cases are determined by principle or by doctrine: see, e.g., WEINRIB,
supra note 7, at 222-6.
9

See DWORKIN, RIGHTS, supra note 7, at 81-130; DWORKIN, PRINCIPLE, supra

note 7, at 119-145.
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that if doctrine is not determined by principle, it will be determined by something else:
majoritarian conceptions of the good, subjective judicial preference, the rhetorical
operations of advocates, or the straightforward operation of force.10 If doctrine were
determined by these forces, the law could not defend its claim to be a normative ordering
distinct from politics and morality. On the other hand, for the neo-realists, the
indeterminacy of doctrine proves the futility of appealing to principle, and thus enables us
to recognize the forces that really determine the content of doctrine.11 For the neoformalists, the soul of law is principled argument; for the neo-realists, the soul of law, if
there is one, is to be found in its consequential effects on other values; and each position
is associated with a view about the legitimacy and determinacy of legal doctrine.
In this article, I take a step towards the reconciliation of neo-realism and neoformalism. I accept the neo-realist claim that legal doctrine cannot be derived in any
determinate way from abstract principles — indeed, I re-assert the claim through a
critique of several contemporary neo-formalists. But I argue that the mere fact of
doctrinal indeterminacy does not make principled legal argument impossible, as the neorealists assume. The indeterminacy of doctrine means only that there may be more than
one doctrine (or set of doctrines) that adequately expresses the principles underlying the
law. Principle operates as a normative constraint — a rather loose one, to be sure, but a
constraint nonetheless — when a legal decision-maker chooses one doctrine over another.

10

DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 7, at 190-195; see also id. at 214; Owen

M. Fiss, The Death of the Law? 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1986).
11

SCHLAG, ENCHANTMENT, supra note 3, at 30-39.

6
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But the indeterminacy of doctrine implies that within the loose constraint of principle, the
decision-maker is free to consider factors that both neo-formalists and neo-realists take to
be excluded by principle. In particular, since principled argument does not determine
doctrine by itself, legal decision-makers can be expected, implicitly or explicitly, to make
consequentialist arguments in choosing among competing legal doctrines. Decisions
reached in this manner should not be considered unprincipled; nor should they be taken to
indicate that principled legal decision-making is impossible. Neither principled argument
nor an analysis of the consequential impact of the law fully determines legal doctrine;
instead, consequentialism can operate within a domain of doctrinal possibilities that are
consistent with principle.
This approach — which I shall call principled consequentialism — is perhaps best
understood as a variety of legal pragmatism. Imagine a legal decision-maker deciding,
not a particular case, but the content of the doctrine to be applied to that case. Should
liability in tort be strict or fault-based? Should liability for a given criminal offense
require proof of a subjective form of mens rea or merely a departure from a standard of
reasonable behavior? The decision-maker will pay respect to principles such as freedom,
fairness, and equality, but will recognize that expressing respect for those principles
through legal doctrine and decision-making can never be disentangled from the
consequences of adopting that doctrine. Thus, he or she is neither wholly principled nor
wholly consequentialist; he or she is ready to accept evidence concerning how effectively
the doctrine chosen embodies principle and forwards other goals, and to change his or her
mind if the doctrine does not work out as expected. He or she will reject doctrines that
plainly violate principle, but will not expect principle alone to determine doctrine;

[2007]
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instead, he or she will allow practical and empirical arguments about the effects of legal
doctrine on other values to play a role in the decision. He or she believes that the answer
chosen is correct, not in the strong sense of being the unique expression of the governing
principles, but in the weaker sense of being consistent with those principles. He or she
recognizes that both the doctrinal answer and the principled, practical, and empirical
arguments on which it was based, are subject to reconsideration and revision in the light
of experience.12 He or she is, in short, taking up a pragmatic attitude towards the task of
determining legal doctrine.13

12

See CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, VALUES IN A UNIVERSE OF CHANCE 118-30

(Philip P. Wiener ed. 1958); WILLIAM JAMES, Pragmatism, in WRITINGS 1902-1910 479
(Bruce Kuklick ed. 1987) [hereinafter JAMES, Pragmatism]; CHERYL J. MISAK, TRUTH
AND THE END OF INQUIRY

(1991); [hereinafter MISAK, INQUIRY]; CHERYL J. MISAK, TRUTH,

POLITICS, MORALITY (2000) [hereinafter MISAK, TRUTH]; ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE
IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS

91-116 (1993); HILARY PUTNAM, REALISM WITH A HUMAN

FACE (1990) [hereinafter PUTNAM, REALISM]; RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, THE NEW
CONSTELLATION: THE ETHICAL-POLITICAL HORIZONS OF MODERNITY/POSTMODERNITY
(1993); HILARY PUTNAM, PRAGMATISM: AN OPEN QUESTION (1995) [hereinafter
PUTNAM, PRAGMATISM]; COLEMAN, PRACTICE, supra note 5, at 3-10.
13

See Radin, Pragmatist, supra note 5; Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and

the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331 (1988); Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal
Pragmatism, 41 STANFORD L. REV. 787 (1989) [hereinafter Grey, Holmes]; Frank
Michelman & Margaret Jane Radin, Pragmatist and Poststructuralist Critical Legal

8
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My task in this article is to defend this pragmatic model of decision-making about
legal doctrine against the neo-formalist claim that it is unprincipled and against the neorealist claim that it cannot be principled. Neo-formalism claims that without principle,
the law would be an incoherent jumble of competing policies and interests; neo-realism
claims that principle serves at best to obscure, and at worst to mystify, the operations of

Practice, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1019 (1991); Thomas C. Grey, Freestanding Legal
Pragmatism, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 21 (1996) [hereinafter Grey, Pragmatism]; Benjamin
C. Zipursky, Pragmatic Conceptualism, 6 LEGAL THEORY 457 (2000). For doubts about
the value of taking a pragmatic approach to law, see BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, REALISTIC
SOCIO-LEGAL THEORY (1997); DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL MODERNISM 125-69 (1994);
Ronald Dworkin, Pragmatism, Rights Answers, and True Banality, in PRAGMATISM IN
LAW AND SOCIETY 359 (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991).
Richard Posner identifies himself as a pragmatist, and his jurisprudential writings
illustrate many of the themes associated with both philosophical and legal pragmatism.
See POSNER, PROBLEMS, supra note 6, at 454-69; RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 227-310 (1999) [hereinafter POSNER,
PROBLEMATICS]; RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY (2003).
But his pragmatism is of a very instrumental variety, as illustrated by his extreme
skepticism about the value of principled legal argument and his unrelentingly
consequentialist account of adjudication. See POSNER, PROBLEMATICS, supra, at 3-38,
and footnotes 65-74 infra and accompanying text. For the purposes of this paper, Posner
is more plausibly classified as a neo-realist than as a legal pragmatist.
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policy and interest. The pragmatic understanding of legal decision-making
accommodates and structures both of these claims. Without principle, the law would
have no purpose; but since principle is a rather loose constraint on doctrine, there is
ample room for the play of policy and interest — and in particular for visions of the good
— to operate.

II.

PRINCIPLES, CONSEQUENCES, AND LEGAL REASONING
A. Principles, Doctrines, and Rules

Principles, doctrines, and rules are all legal norms in that they demand compliance by
legal actors and legal decision-makers. Leal principles are the most abstract legal norms;
they state, in general and often uncompromising terms, norms to which legal doctrines
and legal rules should comply. A legal doctrine stands somewhere between a principle
and a rule. It is an attempt by an authoritative legal decision-maker (a legislature, a court,
an administrative tribunal) to articulate a legal principle or policy in a rule-like way. A
doctrine is thus more particularized and less abstract than a principle, but more abstract
and less rigid than a rule.14 A doctrine does not apply itself once the facts are
determined, in the manner that a rule is supposed to; rather, a doctrine states a legal

14

For the rigidity of rules in this sense, see DWORKIN, RIGHTS, supra note 7, at

24-27. My understanding of the relationship between principles, doctrines, and rules is
somewhat akin to Hall’s. See JEROME HALL, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 9-11 (1947).

10
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consideration that may or may not apply to a given set of facts, depending on the
influence of other doctrines and subsidiary rules.
To see these distinctions, consider the following example. According to the
Canadian constitution, “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person
and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of
fundamental justice”.15 This is a very abstract constitutional guarantee, the content of
which depends on filling in the meaning of words like “liberty” and “fundamental
justice” in a principled way. Canadian courts have done so with reference to the values
that animate the Canadian Constitution as a whole.16 One way in which this principle has
been filled in is with the further principle that punishing the innocent offends the
principles of fundamental justice. This principle, in turn, supports various specific
doctrines that depend on how the court understands innocence; it is, for example, a wellestablished doctrine of Canadian constitutional law that a person is, for penal purposes,
innocent unless some fault has been demonstrated; accordingly, liability without fault

15

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, §7.

16

The foundational case is Reference Re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.),

[1985] 2 S.C.R. 486 [hereinafter Motor Vehicle Reference], where the Supreme Court of
Canada explicitly rejected an originalist interpretation of the Canadian Charter even
though evidence of some of the drafters’ intentions was readily available: ibid. at 495509. On the underlying values of the Canadian Constitution more generally, see
Reference Re: Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 [hereinafter Quebec Secession
Reference].
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offends the principles of fundamental justice.17 Consequently, it is a rule of Canadian
constitutional law that imprisonment for an offense of absolute liability18 violates §7 of
the Charter and, absent a justification under §1, imprisonment for an offence of absolute
liability is unconstitutional.19

17

Motor Vehicle Reference, supra note 16, at 513-518.

18

The term “absolute liability offense” is used in Canadian criminal law to

describe what is called a “strict liability offense” in other jurisdictions. That is, an
offense is one of absolute liability where the prosecution is not required to establish fault,
and the accused has no opportunity to establish lack of fault, so that the accused is liable
regardless of fault. In Canadian criminal law, the term “strict liability offense” is a term
of art used to refer only to those offenses, typically enacted to enforce regulatory statutes,
which have the following structure: the prosecution is required to prove the actus reus,
but the accused may avoid liability by establishing a defense of due diligence on a
balance of probabilities. See R. v. Sault Ste Marie (City), [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1299. In R. v.
Wholesale Travel Group Inc., [1991] 3 S.C.R. 154, the Supreme Court held that, in the
regulatory context, strict liability offenses did not offend the Charter of Rights.
19

These rules arises as follows. § 7 of the Charter is engaged where state action affects

life, liberty or security of the person; everything the state does that affects one of these
three protected interests must comply with the principles of fundamental justice. “No
liability without fault” is a principle of fundamental justice. Therefore, a person cannot
be imprisoned (deprived of liberty) when penal liability is imposed without proof of fault.
See Motor Vehicle Reference, supra note 16, at 575; R. v. Hess; R. v. Nguyen, [1990] 2

12
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The American constitution has a similar principle: “No person ... shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”.20 Yet American
constitutional doctrine relating to fault in penal law is quite different from Canadian
doctrine. Although there is a strong presumption in favor of fault as a matter of statutory
interpretation,21 it has never been held that due process forbids strict liability for
regulatory offenses,22 and there appears to be no constitutional rule prohibiting strict
liability in the criminal law.

S.C.R. 906, 918; R. v. Pontes, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 44, 59-60. This chain of reasoning —
whether conducted at the highest level of principle, the intermediate level of doctrine, or
the lowest level of rule application — does not itself determine what counts as “fault” or
as a deprivation of “liberty” (though imprisonment is an easy case).
20

U.S.C. Const. Amend. V; see also Amend. XIV.

21

See, e.g., Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252-253 (1952); United

States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 438 (1977).
22

Shevlin-Carpenter v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57 (1910); United States v. Balint,

258 U.S. 250 (1922); United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943); United States v.
Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971). In Balint, narcotics offenses were characterized as mala
prohibita rather than mala in se. It is far from obvious that this characterization would be
appropriate today.
The doctrine concerning the constitutionality of strict liability for true crimes, or
mala in se, is mixed. It has on occasion been held that the due process clause prevents a

[2007]

Principled Consequentialism

13

Principles, doctrines, and rules should thus be thought of as lying on a continuum
of ease of application. A principle is very general and requires a host of supporting

state from eliminating the knowledge element of an offense, though usually not because
strict liability in itself is unconstitutional: see, e.g., People v. Estreich, 75 N.Y.S.2d 267
(1947) (elimination of “diligent inquiry” defense to offense of receiving stolen properly
by junk dealer unconstitutional because “an illegal and arbitrary interference with a
lawful business”); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 152-155 (1959) (city ordinance
making possession of obscene material an offense of strict liability struck down as
violating freedom of the press). Other cases have upheld offenses lacking knowledge
requirements for critical components of the actus reus: see, e.g., United States v. Ranson,
942 F.2d 775 (10th Cir. 1991) (district court’s ruling that defendant could not assert defense
of reasonable mistake of age to statutory rape charge did not deprive him of due process);
Commonwealth v. Miller, 432 N.E.2d 463, 465 (Mass. 1984) (absence of any knowledge
element for offense of statutory rape not unconstitutional). In Smith, supra, at 150, the
Supreme Court stated that “it is doubtless competent for the States to create strict
criminal liabilities by defining criminal offenses without any element of scienter ...”
Under Canadian constitutional doctrine, such offenses would violate §7 of the Charter.
See notes 16-19 supra. For a persuasive critique of the United States Supreme Court’s
approach to mens rea in federal statutory offenses, see Richard Singer and Douglas Husak,
Of Innocence and Innocents: The Supreme Court and Mens Rea since Herbert Packer, 2
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 859 (1999); see also Alan C. Michaels, Constitutional Innocence, 112
HARV. L. REV. 828 (1999).

14
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doctrines and rules to be applied to a given set of facts; a doctrine is more rule-like than a
principle but requires a degree of judgment in its application; a rule is (or is meant to be)
easily applied once the facts are known. Another way to put the point is that if a
principle or policy is a normative “concept”, then different doctrines stand as different
“conceptions” of that “concept”.23 The claim that doctrine is determinate is the claim that
one set of doctrines (conceptions of a principle) can be picked out as the correct
consequences of adopting a set of principles (concepts); the claim that doctrine is
indeterminate is the claim that there may be more than one set of doctrines that
adequately expresses a set of principles, or, in its more extreme form, that any doctrine is
consistent with that set of principles.24

23

For the concept/conception distinction, see RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra note 7,

at 14; DWORKIN, RIGHTS, supra note 7, at 134-135; DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra
note 7, at 70-72.
24

My use of the terms “doctrine” and “doctrinal indeterminacy” is thus narrower

than Singer’s. He defines “doctrine” to include “both legal rules and arguments” and
says that a “legal theory or a legal rule is determinate if it tells us what to do”. Joseph
William Singer, The Player and the Cards, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 11 (1984). Contemporary
neo-formalists believe that principle and doctrine are determinately related; they do not,
however, believe that either principle or doctrine determines the outcome of particular
cases because there is an irreducible element of judgment in the application of doctrine to
facts. See WEINRIB, supra note 7, at 166-7 and compare Hamish Stewart, Is Judgment
Inscrutable? 11 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 417 (1998).

[2007]
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B. Principles and Consequences
To set the stage for the debate between principled and consequentialist approaches to
determining legal doctrine, it is first necessary to indicate why there might be a conflict
between them by outlining the difference between deontological and teleological
approaches to normative reasoning. Teleological theories are those which take the
promotion of some conception of the good as the only value, while deontological theories
take the view that considerations of right must, at a minimum, constrain the pursuit of the
good.25 Consequentialism, a species of teleology, is the view that the value of an action
(or a rule) should be judged solely by the consequences produced by performing that
action (or by following that rule).26 An argument in favor of a proposed legal doctrine
can take a deontological or a consequentialist form. If the argument is that the doctrine
best expresses the conception of the person underlying legal relations, or best vindicates
the parties’ rights and duties, then the argument has a deontological form. If the
argument is that the doctrine will have some beneficial effects in the world — such as

25

Compare RAWLS, JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 24-30.

26

Compare Amartya K. Sen, Well-Being, Agency and Freedom, 87 J.PHIL. 169,

175 (1984); Amartya K. Sen, Consequential Evaluation and Practical Reason, 97 J.PHIL.
477 (2000); Bernard Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND
AGAINST 75, 82-8 (1973); T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE EACH OTHER 80 (1998);
JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 268 (1986) (defining “strict
consequentialism”).

16
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promoting economic efficiency, a sense of community, a desirable distribution of income,
or some other goal that is desirable independently of the rights and duties at issue — then
the argument has a consequentialist form.
Deontological and consequentialist arguments frequently conflict with each other
in the sense that the actions they require of a person, or the decisions they require of a
decision-maker, are different. 27 When they do conflict, a choice must be made. If a legal
decision would have desirable consequences but would violate a deontological principle,
the neo-formalist will characterize the decision as wrong, no matter how fervently he or
she believes in the good of the consequence. Put another way, the neo-formalist insists
on the priority of the right over the good. The neo-realist will make the opposite choice.
He or she will embrace the desirable consequence and will urge the neo-formalists to
admit that legal reasoning is nothing more than an instrument for the promotion of some
conception of the good.28 The pragmatist, in contrast to both these views, believes that it
is possible to choose legal doctrines in a principled way while admitting consequentialist
arguments for and against a given doctrine.
To clarify the contrast between these positions, it is necessary to say something
about the types of consequences that might count in a consequentialist argument. A neoformalist might object to my claim that neo-formalism excludes consequences on the

27

The point is made starkly by Amartya K. Sen, Rights and Agency, 11 PHIL. &

PUB. AFF. 1 (1981) [hereinafter Sen, Rights].
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ground that principled legal argument is sensitive to consequences in the following sense.
If a judgment fails to recognize and vindicate a right, the world is, in a sense, a worse
place than it would have been if the judgment had recognized and vindicated the right.29
The world is worse both because the particular plaintiff’s right has not been recognized
and because the decision may act as a precedent for future violations of right. The effect
of legal doctrine and judicial decision-making on the achievement of rights is, in this
sense, as much a “consequence” of the doctrine as its effect on incentives to behave in
particular ways. Call this view “doctrinal consequentialism.” Now, any normative
approach that cares at all about what judges actually do is going to support doctrinal
consequentialism. But doctrinal consequentialism is a weak form of consequentialism
because it does not assess legal doctrines according to their successes or failures in
promoting an idea of the good. More robust forms of consequentialism look to the
desirability of states of affairs that are likely to be promoted by adopting one doctrine
rather than another. For example, an argument that a given doctrine of tort law is more
likely than another to promote an efficient allocation of resources to safety precautions is
consequentialist in this more robust way. But it will be useful to draw a further
distinction between two forms of consequentialism that look to desirable state of affairs.
What I shall call “restricted consequentialism” asks: “What would be the best doctrine,
considering those consequences within the range of consequences appropriate to legal

29
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reasoning?” What I shall call “full consequentialism” asks simply: “What would be the
best doctrine, all things considered, in light of the best theory of the good?”
Restricted consequentialism tends to be a feature of pragmatism, but it is ruled out
by neo-formalism and by certain forms of neo-realism. Since legal pragmatism, like its
philosophical cousin, takes a certain kind of success as a measure of truth,30 the
usefulness of a doctrine in promoting a good state of affairs must be relevant to reasoning
about that doctrine. Yet the pragmatist does not expect law to solve all the problems of
the world, so full consequentialism would be inappropriate. For the neo-formalist, in
contrast, legal doctrines are to be determined by appeal to principles alone. Restricted
consequentialism cannot be part of the neo-formalist model of legal reasoning because it
would permit something other than principle to play a role in the choice of doctrine. For
the neo-realist, principle cannot constrain the pursuit of desirable consequences in any
serious way; it can at best be a source of rules of thumb for promoting the good.31
The neo-formalist might argue that restricted consequentialism must collapse into
doctrinal consequentialism because the only normative considerations that are
legitimately within the law’s domain are principles. Conversely, a neo-realist might
argue that restricted consequentialism must expand into full consequentialism because
legal decision-makers, as moral agents, ought to be concerned with what would be best,

30

PEIRCE, supra note 12, at 132-4, 197-9; WILLIAM JAMES, The Meaning of Truth,

in WRITINGS 1902-1910 821, 823-8 (Bruce Kuklick ed. 1987) [hereinafter JAMES, Truth];
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all things considered. In response to the neo-formalist, I will argue below that
determining doctrine on the basis of principle alone is impossible. In general, there are
several doctrines that will survive the test of principle; the choice among them must be
determined by something, and there is no better candidate than the likely consequences of
applying them. In response to the neo-realist, I would point both to the undesirability of
using the law to enforce a full theory of the good (what Rawls calls a comprehensive
position32) in a liberal society, and to the unlikelihood of a legal decision-maker having
adequate access to all the considerations relevant to determining the best state of affairs.
It is sufficient for a legal decision-maker to confine his or her attention to the purposes of
the law, and to take those purposes as defining the consequences that are within the
domain of the law. For example, deterring harmful behavior is among the purposes of
criminal law, but in a liberal society we do not expect courts deciding criminal cases, or
legislatures enacting criminal statutes, to define “harm” so broadly that the criminal law
amounts to a method of pursuing what are the best outcomes, all things considered.
Rather, the criminal law protects certain basic interests that we are all taken to have,
regardless of our views about the good; indeed, sometimes the criminal law takes us to
have certain protected interests even if our own theory of the good rejects those
interests.33 Within the rather loose constraints imposed by principle, often expressed in

32

RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra note 7, at 175.
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doctrines and rules of constitutional law and in presumptions about the interpretation of
penal statutes, it is legitimate for a legal decision-maker to consider the effectiveness of a
criminal law doctrine in deterring harm.34

C. Three Models of Legal Reasoning
In this section, I briefly describe the three styles of legal reasoning that are at issue in this
article. The first and third of these — the neo-formalist and the pragmatic — can claim
to be principled in the sense that they do not treat legal doctrine as a mere mask for the
operation of other concepts or interests but as part of a normative structure defensible in
its own right. One implication of being principled in this sense is that the right, as
embodied in the doctrine, will be prior to the good and, therefore, respect for right will on
occasion interfere with the achievement of the good. But neo-formalism and pragmatism
differ in the strength of their claim that principled argument — the claims of right —
determine the content of legal doctrine. For the neo-formalist, principle determines
doctrine; for the pragmatist, principle merely acts as a loose constraint on doctrine. The
second style — the neo-realist — rejects principled legal argument altogether.

Jobidon, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 714; GASTON STEFAIN, GEORGES LEVASSEUR & BERNARD
BOULOC, DROIT PÉNAL GÉNÉRALE ¶¶409-11 (18th ed. 2003).
34

This view is akin to, though structurally the reverse of, Hart’s. He held that the

criminal law had a generally utilitarian purpose, but that the pursuit of that purpose was
constrained by principle. See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 1-28
(1965).
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1. Neo-formalism: Reasoning from Principle to Doctrine
At some point in the 1960s, positivist, realist, and process-oriented jurisprudence was
seriously challenged (though never entirely replaced) by a neo-formalist turn to
conceptual analysis, formalism, and principled argument. Dworkin’s anti-positivism and
the Kantian constructivism of Rawls’s moral and political theory are two leading
examples of this style of theorizing.35 The characteristic of neo-formalist theorizing that I
am particularly concerned with in this article is its understanding of principled legal
reasoning. Neo-formalist legal theorists are concerned to limit the arguments that can
legitimately be made in or adopted by a court and to describe philosophically the
difference between a legal argument and some other sort of argument.36 On the neoformalist view, legal argument — and, a fortiori, legal decision-making about doctrine —
should depend solely upon principle. A principled legal argument is one that explains
legal doctrine (and indeed the outcomes of particular cases) as instances of the abstract
legal norms that govern the interactions between persons in private law and the

35
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philosophical structure of legal argument. Rather, it takes comfort in the extent to which
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interactions between persons and the state in public law. The effect of principled legal
argument is to exclude certain values, particularly those relating to the achievement of
some conception of the good, from the purview of the legal decision-maker.
Principled legal argument has an uneasy relationship with consequentialism, and
for good reason. If the consequences produced by adopting a particular legal doctrine are
taken into account, then it seems that the expression of principle through doctrine is
hostage to the ever-shifting empirical evidence concerning the effects of legal doctrines
on some set of desired outcomes. Indeed, it may seem that I am equating “principled”
with “deontological” and placing all other views, including the pragmatic view, in the
consequentialist camp. It will be objected that this division cannot be correct. After all,
it was John Rawls, the dominant neo-formalist of our time, who said: “All ethical
doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One
which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.”37 At the same time, both the founders
of pragmatism and its modern exponents have drunk from the same Kantian spring as
Rawls.38 But a certain style of principled legal reasoning is indeed deontological, and
therefore anti-consequentialist in a very important way: it excludes arguments about the
likely effect of legal doctrines on the good (however the good is envisaged). On this
view, in the forum of principle it does not count for or against a legal doctrine that it
would deter harmful behavior, or that it would promote economic development, or that it

37

RAWLS, JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 26.

38

See, e.g., PEIRCE, supra note 12, at 183-4; PUTNAM, PRAGMATISM, supra note 12,

at 39-45; PUTNAM, REALISM, supra note 12, at 3.

[2007]

Principled Consequentialism

23

would promote a sense of community, or that it would support a fair distribution of
income or resources.39 The neo-formalist’s fear is that to admit these arguments would
be to reduce legal doctrine to an instrument for the advancement of the good, and thereby
cause legal reasoning to lose its autonomy, its claim to principled force, and its
legitimacy.
To illustrate principled legal argument, I will consider two representative neoformalist accounts of tort law — those of Ronald Dworkin and Arthur Ripstein — but the
same kind of analysis can certainly be found elsewhere. For Dworkin, legal argument
should appeal only to principle and not to policy,40 while for Ripstein, legal argument
should reflect only a set of Kantian and Rawlsian ideas concerning the proper grounds for
the use of force by public officials.41 But at this level of generality, the distinction
between principle and policy is ourely formal: the substantive difference between the

39

IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS *211-214 (Mary Gregor

trans., 1996) (1797); DWORKIN, PRINCIPLE, supra note 7, at 60-5; WEINRIB, supra note 7,
at 48-50.
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DWORKIN, RIGHTS, supra note 7, at 82-88; DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra

note 7, at 221-224.
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RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY, supra note 7, at 6-9; Arthur Ripstein, Authority and

Coercion, 32 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3 (2004) [hereinafter Ripstein, Authority]. See also
RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra note 7, at 231-240 (Supreme Court decisions should
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neo-formalist view and other approaches to legal reasoning depends on the difference
between an argument of policy and one of principle. The substantive distinction is
usually cast in terms of arguments from welfare versus arguments from rights, or
teleology versus deontology, or some other opposition that reflects the difference
between instrumental or consequentialist reasons and conceptual or non-consequentialist
reasons for adopting a doctrine. The basis for these distinctions is the neo-formalist view
of human agency that the law is supposed to reflect. Human beings are conceived of as
individuals with the capacity to choose and to pursue their own goals; since human
beings cannot avoid interacting with each other, their legal rights and duties are seen as
making the pursuit of goals mutually possible and consistent. Kant understood right as a
system of “reciprocal coercion”42 in which a limit on one person’s freedom may be
justified only in the interest of another’s freedom.43 The neo-formalists are all Kantian to
the extent that they accept some version of this picture of human agency and the concept
of right.44 Accordingly, they must reject the idea that the law is best understood and
justified as an instrument for pursuing some conception of the good, because judging a
law by its consequences is to attribute a conception of the good to the law and therefore
to justify state coercion on a basis other than freedom. Put another way, principled legal
42

Compare KANT, supra note 39, at *232.
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Id. at *230-1.
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argument takes the right to be prior to the good and so excludes arguments that appeal to
some conception of the good, whether it be cost-benefit analysis, balancing of interests,
or an attractive picture of human association;45 while policy-based argument takes a
conception of the good as relevant to the formation, at least, of legal doctrine.
As will be discussed further below, Ripstein’s account of tort law is squarely in
the Kantian and Rawlsian tradition of political and legal thought. The key to Ripstein’s
argument about the structure and content of tort law is the notion of a fair division of risk.
Each person is envisaged as an actor with an interest in liberty and an interest in security;
in light of these interests, the law treats everyone as an equal by dividing the risk of
conduct fairly.46 It might therefore seem that empirical questions about whether a
doctrine encourages or discourages risky behavior would be relevant to its adoption. But
Ripstein nowhere refers to such empirical questions; and his discussion of the ways in
which courts divide risks through specific rulings suggests that he regards them as
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irrelevant.47 For Ripstein, the interests in liberty and security are very general and are not
meant to be attached to the pursuit (let alone the achievement) of any particular projects
or any particular values. (This is one of the ways in which Ripstein’s project is Rawlsian:
the kind of liberalism it embodies is meant to be neutral among varying views about what
a valuable achievement would be.) But the effectiveness of a legal doctrine would
typically be measured with reference to some such project or value, for example
economic efficiency, or solidarity, or well-being, and so would almost certainly require
the compromise of either liberty or security, and thus of equality, in the pursuit of that
project or value and thus undermine the fair division of risk. So for Ripstein, a legal
argument that depended on the effects of a doctrine on actual interests is impermissible,
at least in tort law, because it makes the good prior to the right.
Dworkin’s account of tort law reaches less definite doctrinal conclusions than
Ripstein’s, but his well-known distinction between principle and policy reflects a similar
effort to protect principled decision-making from consequentialism. However,
Dworkin’s account presents a problem of exegesis that must be resolved before turning to
the substance of his claims about tort law. Dworkin defines the distinction between
principle and policy as follows:

Arguments of policy justify a political decision by showing that the decision
advances or protects some collective goal of the community. … Arguments of

47

Id. at 55-58.

[2007]

Principled Consequentialism

27

principle justify a political decision by showing that the decision respects or
secures some individual or group right.48

He then argues vigorously that arguments of policy are impermissible in adjudication.49
The basic claim is that to admit arguments of policy would be to deny that the legal
system was one of right:

Arguments of principle attempt to justify a political decision that benefits some
person or group by showing that the person or group has a right to the benefit.
Arguments of policy attempt to justify a decision by showing that, in spite of the
fact that those who are benefited do not have a right to the benefit, providing the
benefit will advance a collective goal of the political community.50

But it is not immediately clear what sort of arguments Dworkin means to put in either
category. Consider the following argument: “The court should not enjoin a factory owner
from emitting pollution because the harm the emissions cause to the neighbouring
properties is less than the benefits accruing to society from carrying on production.” On
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Dworkin’s view, is this argument one of policy or principle? Since it appeals to the costs
and benefits likely to flow from the court’s decision, it appears to be one of policy: it is
directed at maximizing the economic value of the emitting factory and the neighbouring
properties taken together. But, in responding to some criticisms by Greenawalt,51
Dworkin stated that consequentialist considerations were not excluded from the forum of
principle. Indeed, he offered certain consequentialist claims as instances of
principled argument.52 Similarly, in discussing a point of evidence law, Dworkin said
that his “normative argument does not in itself condemn judges who consider the social
consequences of one rule of evidence against another”,53 merely that it prevented the
merits of the case being determined on the basis of policy.54 But Dworkin then resiled
from the position that these are arguments of principle, on the ground “that accepting that
sort of reason for refusing to recognize a concrete political right is tantamount to denying
that any abstract political right exists at all, so that it is inconsistent to concede the
abstract right and yet refuse to enforce it in a case like this.”55 Again, in his discussions
of freedom of expression, Dworkin has repeatedly rejected the relevance of the long-run
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benefits of competing regimes for regulating speech in favor of an analysis based on the
“right to moral independence”56 and on the non-instrumental values of expression,57
which in turn spring from the requirement that the state treat each of its members with
equal concern and respect.58
It is thus difficult to say, exegetically, whether Dworkin’s arguments of principle
include or exclude consequentialist “policy arguments” as traditionally understood. If
not, then Dworkin’s framework for legal analysis is as uncompromisingly principled as
any other.59 But if consequentialist policy arguments are allowed to influence the
determination of what the rights of the parties ought to be, then Dworkin’s view reduces
to the purely formal proposition that once a decision-maker has formulated a doctrine,
taking everything into account, it would be contrary to the idea of right to ignore that
doctrine. This formal proposition is perfectly consistent with the pragmatic view outlined
above, or indeed with a rule-utilitarian understanding of legal doctrine, and is far too
weak to support Dworkin’s claims about rights. Moreover, Dworkin’s central political
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value is the idea of equal concern and respect. One implication of equal concern and
respect is that the state should leave its members free to determine for themselves which
conception of the good to endorse and pursue; in determining individuals’ rights, it
should therefore refrain from taking up strong positions on this question.60 But deciding
questions of policy nearly always requires just such a position because it requires
weighing the concrete interests of one against those of another. Policy arguments must
be banished from the forum of principle in order to protect the requirement that the state
show equal concern and respect for each of its members. Therefore, for the purposes of
this paper, I will resolve the exegetical question in favor of the first view: Dworkin’s
understanding of principled adjudication requires the exclusion of policy arguments,
understood as arguments “promot[ing] some conception of the general welfare or public
interest.”61
Neo-formalist legal argument, then, typically begins with a relatively abstract
picture of human beings as agents interacting with one another, and seeks to provide an
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account of their rights and duties that eschews, as far as possible, a conception of the
good. Legal doctrines are to be understood (as far as possible) without reference to their
probable consequences in order to preserve (as far as possible) the moral independence of
the individual human agent.
2. Neo-Realism: The Rejection of Principle
The neo-realist asserts that the principles and concepts that feature so prominently in
judicial decision-making and academic commentary are essentially meaningless. At best,
they stand in for, and at worst they disguise, what is really going on: the use of state
power to forward some goal that is external to the law. Some neo-realists take the next
logical step and assert that the law ought expressly to promote a particular external
good.62
Certain strands of economic analysis of law nicely illustrate the neo-realist
approach. Tort law concepts such as duty, causation, and remoteness are explained in
terms of the fundamental goal of tort law: the efficient allocation of resources to the
prevention of accidents.63 In its clearest normative form, the economic claim is that,
regardless of the substantive content of traditional tort law concepts, the law of tort ought
to orient itself exclusively to the goal of promoting economic efficiency.64
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Richard Posner, who is both a leader of the law and economics movement and a
severe critic of deontological approaches to law, has often argued that principles have
little or nothing to offer a judge trying to decide a hard case, and in particular that a judge
tends to fall back on principles only when he or she doesn’t know enough about the
consequences of choosing one doctrine over another.65 At best, in Posner’s view,
“Notions such as toleration and equality … can be treated as policies instrumental to
various social goals such as peace, strength, prosperity, and the conciliation of the
potentially disaffected.”66 The neo-realist, then, has no normative interest in legal
principles for their own sake; he or she is interested only in the effect of the application
of legal principles on normative values that are wholly independent of the law.67
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3. Principled Consequentialism
Principled consequentialism — a form of legal pragmatism — is motivated by the
thought that both neo-formalism and neo-realism are incomplete. Neo-formalism is
incomplete because it is in general not possible to determine legal doctrine on the basis of
principle alone.68 Neo-realism is incomplete because its relentless attention to
consequences gives us no reason to take an interest in any consequences in particular.
Legal reasoning ought to be based on legal principles; but since legal principles do not
determine doctrine all by themselves, it is necessary to refer to the likely effects of
adopting one doctrine over another in order to choose between different possible
doctrinal expressions of the underlying principles.
To see how principles consequentialism operates, imagine a case that is hard in
the sense that it is unclear what doctrine should be applied to the facts. For concreteness,
suppose that an individual is accused of an offense and the question is what form of fault
(if any) the prosecution must prove to obtain a conviction. The resources available to a
judge deciding such a case include the existing corpus of legal materials (statutes, case
law, and commentary), the arguments of the parties, and the judge’s own political
morality. The legal materials will contain abstract principles; legal doctrines that attempt
to express those abstract principles; and legal rules. The principles, doctrines, and rules
may or may not be binding on the judge, depending on their source and on the judge’s
authority, and apart from their bindingness, they may have more or less persuasive force.
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The parties’ arguments will naturally refer to these materials, but are likely also to
contain consequentialist arguments directed at the desirability of adopting one doctrine
over another. Furthermore, the judge’s political morality will more or less consciously
influence his or her analysis of the materials and the parties’ arguments.
This description of the judge’s task is familiar from the literature concerning legal
reasoning.69 But note that the neo-formalist and the neo-realist approaches radically
simplify the judge’s task, though of course in different ways. For the neo-formalist, the
question is to be determined solely on the basis of principle, so that any consequentialist
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argument concerning the effects of the decision will be irrelevant. For the neo-realist,
any reference to principle (or for that matter to precedent) is at best window-dressing;
what really matters is the consequential effects of the doctrine chosen. The pragmatist
has quite a different view about how to resolve a hard case. Principled consequentialism
permits an answer that neither relies solely on principle nor wholly subordinates principle
to the pursuit of desirable consequences. So the question of the appropriate fault standard
for a particular offense should be determined with reference to both principles and
consequences. A system of criminal law might be committed to principles that connect
the imposition of criminal liability with the rights and duties of individuals. These
abstract principles will create pressure to understand the interaction between accused
persons and alleged victims of crime in terms of concepts that are familiar from moral
philosophy and criminal law theory: is there any conduct that can be properly attributed
to the accused? What was the accused’s attitude towards the conduct and towards the
victim? What was the effect of the conduct on the victim’s rights and interests? The
abstract principles will therefore tend to support the doctrine of fault-based liability
because imposing liability without fault significantly attenuates the notions of
responsibility and attribution. But the abstract principles also tend to support doctrines
that make violations of victims’ rights, or serious effects on victims’ interests, central to
the imposition of criminal liability. The accused and the victim are both persons;
principled legal analysis should therefore attend to both of them. 70 But, consistent with

70

It is difficult to draw precise doctrinal conclusions about offense elements from

the literature on victims’ rights, partly because that literature is more concerned with
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this attention to both parties to the interaction, there are many possible fault standards.
Therefore, consequentialist arguments are likely to be highly relevant in determining
which doctrine to adopt. For example, the judge may want to know whether adopting
one doctrine over another is likely to have any effect in deterring the wrongful behavior
at issue. While principled legal argument typically does not rely on deterrent-based
arguments (because they are consequentialist), it might be contended that the better a
doctrine is at deterring wrongful behavior, the better it is at protecting the rights of
potential victims. But whether a particular legal doctrine has or has not a deterrent effect
is an empirical question.71 The consequentialist issue —whether the doctrine deters

procedural than substantive issues, and partly because a victims’ rights approach may
support “reintegration” rather than punishment of the offender: see JOHN BRAITHWAITE,
CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION (1989); KENT ROACH, DUE PROCESS AND VICTIM’S
RIGHTS (1999). But see GEORGE FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME 120-131 (1994)
(arguing that for the offense of sexual assault, a defense of reasonable belief in consent
would both accommodate victims’ perspectives and be fair to the accused).
71

It appears that neither the doctrines of criminal law nor the severity of the

sentence imposed on an offender has any significant deterrent effect: see Paul H.
Robinson & John M. Darby, Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioural Science
Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. LEG.STUD. 173 (2004); Anthony N. Doob & Cheryl Marie
Webster, Sentence Severity and Crime: Accepting the Null Hypothesis, 30 CRIME AND
JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 143 (Michael Tonry ed. 2003). But the point I am
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wrongful or harmful behavior — comes into play to help a legal decision-maker choose a
doctrine where principled legal argument cannot.
Thus, principled consequentialism draws from, but differs from, both the neoformalist and the neo-realist approach. For the neo-formalist, there could be only one
principled answer to the doctrinal question posed, and a failure to adopt it would simply
be legally erroneous. But it is not plausible to argue that there is for every contested
doctrinal question only one answer consistent with principle. For the neo-realist,
principle would not constrain the answer in any meaningful way: only consequences
should count. But consequentialist argument cannot provide a complete solution to the
question posed because there is no reason to attend to any consequences in particular
without some normative basis that is best expressed in principled terms. This point is a
familiar objection to utilitarianism,72 but it also applies to other consequentialist
approaches. Consider, for example, Posner’s explanation of the role of principle in
criminal law:

… we can decide to treat criminals with dignity not because we buy into the
Kantian notion that people are entitled to be treated as ends but because we think

making here is not about the answer to the question, but about the legitimacy of the
question.
72

The objection is that utilitarianism treats persons merely as locations for the

accumulation of utility; but under this conception of a person, there is no particular
reason to value utility. See note 195 infra and accompanying text.
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… that cultivating a “we-they” or “enemy within” or even a “medical” or
“therapeutic” mentality of criminal punishment can have untoward political
consequences and even impair the deterrence and prevention of criminal behavior.
You wouldn’t have to be a utilitarian to make a judgment of this sort. The point
would be not that the “enemy within” approach to crime reduces the sum of
American (or human, or cosmic) happiness, but that it collides with specific
political and criminological objectives of our society. A moral vocabulary would
be adopted for pragmatic purposes.73

The suggestion is that Kantian (or any other) principles are unnecessary to the
determination of the desirability of legal doctrine concerning punishment because the
decision about doctrine can be made solely with reference to the consequences of
adopting it. But consequences do not arrive in the world already labeled “desirable” or
“undesirable”.74 We need a normative theory — a set of principles — to tell us which
consequences count and how. Any capable Kantian political theorist will have no
difficulty in connecting the notion that individuals are “are entitled to be treated as ends”

73

POSNER, PROBLEMATICS, supra note 13, at 112.

74

Though Posner argues that there is nothing intelligent to be said about this

labeling exercise: id. at 45-64.
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with society’s “political and criminological objectives”,75 though he or she will of course
take the individual end-status of persons as a serious constraint on what can be done in
the furtherance of that objective. Neo-realism’s injunction to attend only to the
consequences of legal doctrine is incomplete without a principled account of which
consequences count.76 Principled consequentialism incorporates both the neo-formalist
demand that legal reasoning be principled and the neo-realist claim that consequences
matter.
On this view of legal decision-making about doctrine, legal reasoning is a species
of practical reasoning over a particular domain.77 Legal reasoning is principled in that it

75

For Kant’s own views on this matter, see KANT, supra note 39, at *305-8; see

also Ripstein, Authority, supra note 41, at 26-35.
76

The incompleteness of legal neo-realism is one instance of the incompleteness

of a purely instrumental approach to any problem. Compare Grey, Holmes, supra note
13, at 850 (“Holmes’ predicament … was to be an instrumentalist without an adequate
system of ends.”); MAX HORKHEIMER, ECLIPSE OF REASON 3-57 (1947); Hamish Stewart,
A Critique of Instrumental Reason in Economics, 11 ECON. & PHIL. 57 (1995)
[hereinafter Stewart, Critique]; and, in a slightly different vein, Zipursky, Pragmatic
Conceptualism, supra note 13, at 475-6.
77

By “practical reasoning”, I mean simply that the law is a social institution that

is supposed to tell us what to do, within the area that it applies to. I do not necessarily
mean to endorse the descriptions of law as practical reasoning that have been offered as
alternatives to neo-formalism and neo-realism, though this article is motivated by many
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respects the abstract, deontological principles embodied in legal materials, such as
respect for human agency and dignity, equality, and procedural fairness. It does not
subordinate the individual to strong conceptions of the good or presume that individuals
must adopt any conception in particular. But legal reasoning is attentive to the
consequences (in the restricted sense) of adopting one legal doctrine over another because
it must be: since principles do not in themselves determine doctrines, a decision-maker
should attend to the probable effects of his or her decision on the generalized interests
that the criminal law is concerned with. Legal reasoning can be deductive in a limited
sense: since many legal rules state that certain results should flow from the presence of
certain factual elements, a legal result can be deduced from the presence of those
elements.78 But the deductive use of legal rules is purely formal: the pragmatist has no
expectation that the features of a case can be uncontroversially classified as legally

of the same concerns that prompted those descriptions. For exposition and critique of
law as practical reasoning, see Steven J. Burton, Law as Practical Reason, 62
S.CAL.L.REV. 747 (1988-89); David E. Van Zandt, An Alternative Theory of Practical
Reason in Judicial Decisions, 65 TULANE L.REV. 775 (1990-91); Daniel A. Farber, The
Inevitability of Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism, and the Rule of Law, 45
VANDERBILT L.REV. 533 (1992); STEVEN D. SMITH, LAW’S QUANDARY 91-95 (2004).
78

MACCORMICK, supra note 61, at 19-32. Note also his proviso on the limits of

deductive reasoning in generating the judge’s order: id. at 65-72.
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cognizable facts for the purpose of deduction,79 or that doctrines can be uncontroversially
derived from abstract principles. Legal reasoning is pragmatic because it is concerned
with both principles and consequences: it strives to give expression to the principled
notion that the legal order should recognize human agency, but it understands that any
expression of principle is going to depend on what counts as a desirable consequence and
therefore on some understanding of the good.

III.

PRINCIPLED REASONING AND DOCTRINAL INDETERMINACY: TWO
EXAMPLES

Some years ago, Michelman and Radin conveniently summarized the argument that
doctrine is indeterminate as follows: “from highly abstract principles of right,
convincingly neutral and consistent treatment of cases cannot be derived.”80 This

79

MACCORMICK, supra note 61, at 93-7; see also Hamish Stewart, Contingency

and Coherence: The Interdependence of Realism and Formalism in Legal Theory, 30
VALP.U.L.REV. 1, 27-48 (1995) [hereinafter Stewart, Contingency] (discussing problems
of characterization in tort law); Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive
Criminal Law, 33 STANFORD L. REV. 591, 600-20 (1981) (discussing the effects of
“framing” in criminal cases).
80

Frank Michelman and Margaret Jane Radin, Pragmatist and Poststructuralist

Critical Legal Practice, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1019, 1035-1036 (1991) (characterizing a
post-structuralist argument against universal principles in law). See also KENNEDY,
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statement was not intended to be controversial; it was offered as an uncontroversial
characterization of a familiar argument in a symposium on the normativity of law.81 In
this part of this article, I restate the claim that doctrine is indeterminate even when
abstract principles are agreed upon. But, one may ask: why bother? What is the purpose
of arguing yet again for a proposition that has been so widely accepted for so long? I
have two reasons for doing so. In the first place, whatever Michelman and Radin and
their fellow symposiasts may have anticipated, many scholars still engage in the style of
theorizing which deduces legal doctrine from abstract liberal principles. 82 Indeed, in the

CRITIQUE, supra note 3, at 51, 275; RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF
JURISPRUDENCE 460 (1990) [hereinafter POSNER, PROBLEMS]; SCHLAG, ENCHANTMENT,
supra note 3, at 30-33; MACCORMICK, supra note 61, at 123-4; Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45, 75 per Holmes J. dissenting (1905).
81

Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 801

(1991); Richard Delgado, Norms and Normal Science: Toward a Critique of Normativity
in Legal Thought, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 933 (1991); Steven Winter, Contingency and
Community in Normative Legal Practice, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 963 (1991).
82

I will be particularly concerned with RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY, supra note 7, but also

with WEINRIB, supra note 7; DWORKIN, RIGHTS, supra note 7; BRUDNER, UNITY, supra
note 7; and RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra note 7. See also Ronald Dworkin, Darwin’s New
Bulldog, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1718 (1998); Charles Fried, Philosophy Matters, 111 HARV.
L. REV. 1739 (1998); Anthony T. Kronman, The Value of Moral Philosophy, 111 HARV.
L. REV. 1751 (1998); John T. Noonan, Jr., Posner’s Problematics, 111 HARV. L. REV.
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years since Michelman and Radin’s statement was written, the scholars with whom I am
particularly concerned have all published comprehensive works of principled legal
analysis without showing any particular concern for the problem of doctrinal
indeterminacy. Second, this style of theorizing remains extremely valuable; while it
cannot deliver determinate doctrinal results, it does indicate some of the constraints that
might be imposed upon, or at least the considerations that might inform, the construction
of legal doctrine.
In the two examples which follow, I outline how proponents of principled legal
analysis draw rather precise doctrinal conclusions from abstract principles. I then argue
that their conclusions are not sustainable without some tacit reliance on factors that are
usually excluded from principled legal argument: in particular, on what counts as a good
consequences and therefore on some conception of the good. Finally, I indicate how a
pragmatic approach to doctrinal decision-making might deal with these two examples,
aspiring to express principle while taking consequences into account.

A. The Standard of Liability in Tort Law
A recurring doctrinal controversy in tort law concerns the appropriate standard for
liability: should tort liability be strict — the defendant is liable for any harm he or she
causes — or fault-based — the defendant is liable only for harm caused by his or her

1768 (1998); Martha Nussbaum, Still Worthy of Praise, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1776 (1998);
Richard A. Posner, Reply to Critics of The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111
HARV. L. REV. 1796 (1998).
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departure from a standard of care? I begin with the views of those who argue for one or
the other for non-instrumental reasons of justice or fairness. While the views of these
scholars differ in many respects, they share a liberal conception of the person and of the
law. The person is imagined as an agent, capable of having projects and of acting in
pursuit of those projects, capable of bearing responsibility for actions and consequences,
and capable of bearing rights. The law is imagined, not as directing itself towards any
particular purpose, but as constraining agents in the pursuit of their own purposes.83
From this liberal conception of the person, different scholars derive different answers to
the doctrinal question of the proper standard of liability.
Richard Epstein argues for strict liability rather than negligence as the standard of
liability in tort on the ground that strict liability appropriately puts the costs of a person’s
actions on that person and not on others. Consider the facts of the famous and puzzling
case of Vincent v. Lake Erie Transport. Co.84 The captain of a ship tied his ship to a dock

83

Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEG. STUD. 151, 203-204

(1973) [hereinafter Epstein, Strict Liability]; WEINRIB, supra note 7, at 84-100; RIPSTEIN,
EQUALITY, supra note 7, at 6-15; see also ANDREW ALTMAN, CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES:
A LIBERAL CRITIQUE 23-4 (1990).
84

Vincent v. Lake Erie Transport. Co., 124 N.W. 221 (Min. 1910). The case is

also discussed by WEINRIB, supra note 7, at 196-203; RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY, supra note 7,
at 118-21; George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV.L.REV. 537,
544-547 (1972); JULES COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 371-372 (1992) [hereinafter
COLEMAN, RISKS]; STEPHEN WADDAMS, DIMENSIONS OF PRIVATE LAW 86-7 (2003).
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during a storm, without permission from the owner of the dock. The dock was damaged.
Although the court agreed that the ship was entitled to take refuge at the dock, the court
held the owner of the ship liable for the damage to the dock. Epstein observes that this
result “seems inconsistent with either of the customary explanations, moral or economic,
of negligence in tort law.”85 He then asks his readers to imagine that the ship and the
dock had been owned by the same person. This person would then have to make some
decision about what to do in the storm, but whatever the decision, he or she “would bear
the consequences and would have no recourse against anyone else.”86 This approach
becomes paradigmatic for tort law as a whole. Generally speaking, one ought not to be
permitted to shift the costs of one’s activity onto others. “The action in tort enables the
injured party to require the defendant to treat the loss he has inflicted on another as

85

Epstein, Strict Liability, supra note 83, at 158.

86

Id.
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though it were his own.” 87 Hence, liability in tort should be strict: everyone should be
liable for the harm that his or her conduct causes, subject only to various defenses.88
This argument rests on “the assumption that the term causation has a content
which permits its use in a principled manner.”89 Rejecting both the cause-in-fact and
cause-in-law dichotomy found in the case law and the policy-driven analysis of causation
found in much of the academic literature,90 Epstein avoids offering a general definition of
causation and instead develops “four distinct paradigm cases covered by the proposition
‘A caused B harm.’”91 These paradigm cases are intended to justify the use of the word
“cause” in a common sense manner by analogy with these cases.92

87

Id. Compare id. at 158-9 (“The argument applies equally to cases where there

is only the risk of harm. If the defendant ... took the risk of injury to his own person or
property, he would bear all the costs and enjoy all the benefits of that decision whether or
not it was correct. The same result should apply where a person ‘only’ takes risks with
the person or property of other individuals.”).
88

Richard A. Epstein, Defenses and Subsequent Pleas in a System of Strict

Liability, 3 J. LEG. STUD. 165 (1974).
89

Epstein, Strict Liability, supra note 83, at 160.

90

Id. at 160-165.

91

Id. at 166.

92

“Epstein ... autocratically stipulat[es] the meaning of cause. The paradigm

cases, he decrees, as cases of causation. ... [But] the paradigm cases of causation identify
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As has often been pointed out, for Epstein’s account to hold together, the “cause”
of an accident must be identifiable independently of any normative theory of the purposes
of tort law, or of the rights of the parties; otherwise, it will be that normative theory,
rather than the common sense notion of causation, that drives the analysis. Put another
way, for Epstein it is the notion of causation that is supposed to define the parties’ tort
rights, not the other way around; but if it is not possible to insulate the determination of
causation from normative questions, Epstein’s argument is incomplete or even
incoherent.93 As Ripstein, echoing Coase, puts it, “Interaction is always reciprocal in the
way that [Epstein’s] account needs to avoid”.94 In general, either party could have done

the bearer of legal responsibility only because Epstein arbitrarily excludes troubling
examples from the paradigm.” BRUDNER, UNITY, supra note 7, at 162.
93

This point is thoroughly argued by Stephen Perry, The Impossibility of General

Strict Liability, 1 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 147 (1988) [hereinafter Perry, Impossibility]; see
also Stephen Perry, Risk, Harm, and Responsibility, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
TORT LAW 321, 339-343 (David G. Owen ed. 1995); COLEMAN, RISKS, supra note 84, at
273-275; BRUDNER, UNITY, supra note 7, at 161-165. For a related point aimed at a
different target, see Stewart, Contingency, supra note 79, at 23-48.
94

RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY, supra note 7, at 39; see also RONALD COASE, THE FIRM,

THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 96 (1988). Epstein was, of course, well aware of Coase’s
critique of the common law approach to causation and offered his four paradigms in
response: Epstein, Strict Liability, supra note 83, at 164-165. But Epstein offered
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something to avoid the harm, and in that sense it is always the case that both parties
“cause” the harm. To say that one party is the legal “cause” of the harm, we need a
reason to disregard the other party’s contribution to the harm; but that reason can only
come from some notion of what the parties ought to be doing, namely, a view about their
rights and duties.95
Some of Epstein’s critics argue further that strict liability is not merely dependent
on a conception of rights, but inconsistent with the underlying picture of human action
that Epstein himself uses, and therefore inconsistent with the idea of right itself. Only the
negligence standard, it is argued, adequately recognizes both the plaintiff and the
defendant as actors in the world. Ripstein, arguing that only the negligence standard
fairly divides the risks of action between persons, puts the point this way:

The fault standard holds agents responsible in a way that aims to be fair to both
the injurer and the injured party. Each has a liberty interest in going about his or
her own affairs, and a security interest in being free of injury. Pursued to their
limits, these interests are bound to conflict. An unlimited interest in security
would prevent others from acting, because virtually all action creates a risk of
injury. Conversely, an unlimited interest in liberty would make the security of
one person hostage to the choices of others. Either of these approaches would

nothing more than an appeal to common sense as a reason to reject Coase’s
characterization of problems of causation as reciprocal.
95

BRUDNER, supra note 7, at 163.
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violate the fundamental principle of equality, which requires that one person may
not unilaterally set the terms of interaction.96

Thus Ripstein argues against strict liability on the grounds that it “would prevent others
from acting, because virtually all action creates a risk of injury”97 and that “[t]o make
injurers bear the full risk [of injury] would forego the interest in liberty”.98
These neo-formalist arguments against Epstein’s approach, if persuasive, have
sweeping consequences for tort doctrine. They purport to show that a quite abstract idea
about how the actions of equal persons should relate to each other directly resolves an
important doctrinal controversy; they require either rejection or extremely creative
analysis of the rare occasions on which the common law recognized strict liability;99 and
they imply that the American law of products liability is incoherent with this abstract idea
and to that extent unjust.100
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RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY, supra note 7, at 49; see also BRUDNER, UNITY, supra note

7, at 189-90. Weinrib argues in the same vein that strict liability amounts to “hold[ing]
the agent liable for being active” and is therefore inconsistent with the equal status of
plaintiff and defendant. WEINRIB, supra note 7, at 181.
97

RIPSTEIN, supra note 7, at 49.

98

Id. at 50.

99

WEINRIB, supra note 7, at 187-90; RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY, supra note 7, at 70-2.

100

Compare WEINRIB, supra note 7, at 184 n. 24.
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But these arguments are not fully persuasive as they stand. Imposing strict
liability rather than negligence does not in itself violate equality or make agents liable
just for being agents; rather, replacing negligence with strict liability in the way Epstein
proposes would change the activities that a person could undertake without liability. Put
another way, a change in doctrine from negligence to strict liability would change the
costs and benefits associated with actions. To show that this change is unfair, unjust, or
undesirable would require further argument, perhaps including empirical consideration of
the effects of each form of liability on important values.101 For example, strict liability
for defective products, in those jurisdictions where such liability is in force, has neither
prevented manufacturing from occurring nor negated manufacturers’ liberty. Strict
liability may, or may not, have affected the allocation of resources to safety, the price of
the products, the degree of care exercised by consumers; it may, or may not, have
prevented certain products from being manufactured altogether, but it has not made
manufacturing impossible. Again, if there were strict liability for motor vehicle
accidents, people might, or might not, drive differently. They would not be prevented
from driving. Nor, with some control on the scope of causation, would they be liable for
all the effects of their driving. A change in the tort regime does not make action

101

The neo-formalist critique of Epstein’s theory of strict liability is persuasive to

the extent that it demonstrates the incoherence of Epstein’s attempt to identify the cause
of a harm apart from any normative theory about rights and duties. But, as long as the
need for some normative theory that controls the scope of causation is recognized, the
standard of strict liability is not itself subject to the critique.
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impossible but changes the costs and benefits of various actions. We require further
normative argument to determine whether these changes are desirable.
If we were to continue in a neo-formalist vein, we might seek that further
normative argument in Ripstein’s larger purpose, which is to offer an account of the
doctrines of tort law as flowing from reasonable terms of social co-operation:

The basic strategy for dividing risks is to look to the interests in both security and
liberty that all are presumed to share. If neither liberty nor security interests are to
totally cancel the significance of the other, some balance must be struck between
them. Rather than trying to balance those interests across persons ... the fault
system balances them within representative persons. By supposing that all have
the same interests in both liberty and security, the fault system treats parties as
equals, by allowing a like liberty and security to all.102

This is a very plausible claim, but it is a retreat from the claim that strict liability
somehow undermines the very idea of action; rather, it is a claim that strict liability
represents an unfair division of the risks of action in that it favors security over liberty.
But, again, we must ask whether even this weaker claim flows from Ripstein’s normative
premisses. As Ripstein himself says, a “fair division of risks required that particular risks
... be assigned to activities in contexts.”103 Indeed; and reasonable people, constructing
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RIPSTEIN, supra note 7, at 50.
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legal doctrines reflecting fair terms of social co-operation in which no-one gets to set the
terms of interaction unilaterally, might well conclude that in the context of defects in
manufactured products, the risk of injury owing to defects ought to be borne as far as
possible by the manufacturer rather than the user. The importance to security of avoiding
personal injury to living a life of one’s own might well outweigh the liberty interest in
manufacturing soft drinks or automobiles for profit. In another context, the fault
standard, or allowing losses to lie where they fall, might well be appropriate. Or it might
not; my point is simply that the principle of dividing risk through fair terms of social cooperation, however important and attractive it may be as a principle, does not by itself
determine the appropriate legal regime for tort liability.
A parallel point might be made with respect to a less demanding standard of fault.
Imagine that liability in tort depended on subjective fault: a defendant would not be liable
unless he or she realized that his or her conduct departed from the relevant standard of
care. Ripstein might plausibly regard the subjective standard as promoting a Hobbesian
state of nature by eliminating security interests altogether, or at least as unacceptably
subordinating security to liberty.104 Now, I would certainly not argue for a subjective
standard of fault in tort, but I suspect that such a standard would not destroy personal
security; rather, it would change the costs and benefits of action, this time (presumably)
favoring certain defendants and disfavoring certain plaintiffs. It would neither eliminate
the security interest nor deny the juridical equality of plaintiff and defendant. It would

104

Similarly, Weinrib regards the subjective standard as inconsistent with the

particular type of equality vindicated by tort law. WEINRIB, supra note 7, at 177-179.
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simply offer a different conception of the proper relationship between security and
equality.
Ripstein’s arguments against strict liability in tort are not without force: they
simply show less than he thinks. It is indeed incoherent to assert that liability should
depend only on the effects of action, not because it would “hold the agent liable for being
active”105, but because it is not possible to describe what the effects of the agent’s actions
are without a normative theory that picks out some of those effects as properly
attributable to the agent.106 Thus the neo-formalist argument turns out to be not an
argument against strict liability as such, but an argument against Epstein’s refusal to
engage in the required normative exercise, or perhaps against Epstein’s common-sense
version of the exercise. Once that exercise was engaged in, there might well be an
argument for strict liability. It would not be Epstein’s, but could take the following form:
“In light of the values relevant to tort law (e.g., security, liberty, equality), and with a
proper limitation on the scope of causation, defendants should be strictly liable for certain
effects of their conduct because the standard of strict liability furthers some conception of
the public welfare better than the standard of negligence.” An argument of this form
combines principled legal argument and consequentialism: it recognizes that a legal
doctrine cannot be based on the denial of agency, but it asserts that more than one
doctrine may respect principle and that the consequential effects of doctrinal choice are
relevant to that choice.
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The principled, liberal starting-point that Epstein and Ripstein share — the idea
that tort law should structure the interactions of free, purposive agents — rules out the
initially appealing notion that everyone should be liable in tort for the harm he or she
causes. This standard would be impossible to apply, owing to the irreducibly reciprocal
nature of causation. But Ripstein’s principled argument favoring negligence over strict
liability does not succeed in showing that strict liability is inconsistent with principle.
Instead, it shows something less sweeping but still important: any argument for or against
a particular standard of liability in tort law must attend to the effects of the proposed
standard on agents’ ability to act and to be secure from the effects of others’ action. The
final choice of doctrine must therefore be made with reference to the consequences that
are likely to flow from the choice.

B. The Requirement of Fault in Criminal Law
A recurring doctrinal controversy in criminal law concerns the requirement of fault. It is
usually agreed that criminal liability should depend on proof of fault; but there is much
judicial and scholarly debate as to what type of fault should be required. Should liability
depend on proof of subjective fault (the accused intended a consequence, or knew of a
circumstance, or was aware of a risk) or merely on proof of objective fault (the accused
ought to have known that his conduct would cause a consequence, or ought to have been
aware of a circumstance or of a risk)?107 Are there any circumstances under which
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Two classic discussions favoring the requirement of subjective fault for

criminal offenses are found in HALL, supra note 14, at 169-246, 279-322 (1947);
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criminal liability might be justly imposed without fault of any sort? While most scholars
are prepared to accept subjective fault as a requirement for the gravest offenses, there is
controversy about which offenses fall into this category, which actus reus elements
require a corresponding subjective fault element, and whether all criminal offenses also
require subjective fault. These debates about particular offenses reflect a larger debate

GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 30-99 (2d ed. 1961). The
distinction between subjective and objective fault has taken on constitutional significance
under §7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms with the development of the
doctrine that the fault element of an offense must be proportional to the stigma of and
available penalties for the offense. See R. v. Vaillancourt, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636; R. v.
Martineau, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 663; R. v. Creighton, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 3; R. v. Finta, [1994] 1
S.C.R. 701, 813-20; DON STUART, CANADIAN CRIMINAL LAW: A TREATISE 196-208 (4th
ed. 2001); Alan Brudner, Proportionality, Stigma, and Discretion, 38 CRIM. L.Q. 302
(1996) [hereinafter Brudner, Proportionality]; George P. Fletcher, The Meaning of
Innocence, 48 U. TORONTO L.J. 157 (1998); James Stribopoulos, The Constitutionalization
of “Fault” in Canada: A Normative Critique, 42 CRIM. L.Q. 227 (1999); Hamish Stewart,
R. v. Darrach: A Step Forward in the Constitutionalization of Fault? 4 CAN.CRIM.L.REV.
9 (1999) [hereinafter Stewart, Step Forward]. The development of a comparable doctrine
in American constitutional law seems to have been arrested by a line of cases beginning
with Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57 (1910) and United States v. Balint,
258 U.S. 250 (1922). In these cases, the Court held that the due process clause did not
prevent the legislature from creating a strict liability offense. See also note 21 supra.
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about whether it is intentional wrongdoing or serious harm-doing that is paradigmatically
criminal. My purpose here is not primarily to rehearse these debates but, as in the
previous section, to criticize the suggestion that they can be determined simply by
adopting an overarching normative principle. Various fault standards for various
offenses may be consistent with any given principle, leaving the choice between them to
be made on the basis of other criteria.
Again I begin by considering a liberal concept of the person and of the law.
Persons are conceived of as agents who have purposes and who are capable of acting in
pursuit of those purposes. The law constrains not their purposes but the means they may
use in pursuit of their purposes. It is a little difficult at first glance to see what role this
concept of the person has for criminal law. If we are concerned not about purposes but
about the extent to which one person’s conduct impinges on another’s right, why should
we care about why a wrongdoer has infringed a right or about punishing the wrongdoer
(rather than deterring the wrongdoer or compensating the victim)?108 One possible
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This problem arises in, among other places, Kant’s discussion of criminal

punishment. He accepted the basic distinction between criminal (intentional) and civil
(unintentional) wrongdoing, but argued that the law was concerned only with the external
relationships between agents and not with their motivations. KANT, supra note 39, at
*223-224, 320, 214. Thus, it is not obvious why he required the distinction between
crimes and private wrongs. To put the point another way: For Kant, the distinction
between crimes and other wrongs has to do with the maxim on which the criminal acts;
but it is unclear why, for Kant, the criminal’s maxim matters for legal purposes (though it

[2007]

Principled Consequentialism

57

answer is provided by Ripstein who, it will be recalled, presents an account of law as
expressing fair terms of social co-operation or interaction between free and equal agents.
These agents would, Ripstein argues, divide the risks of conduct, or set the boundaries
between persons, on the assumption that persons are equal in the sense that each has an
interest in liberty and security. The resulting legal rules are reasonable in the Rawlsian
sense of expressing “an idea of fair terms of social cooperation.”109 The function of the
criminal law is “to protect and vindicate fair terms of interaction”:

Criminal acts are those acts in which one person seeks to substitute private
rationality for public standards of reasonableness. … Punishment is required in
order to address the wrongful substitution. It takes the form of hard treatment
because it addresses itself to the putative rationality of the wrongful deed.110

clearly matters for ethical purposes). This difficulty in Kant’s philosophy of right is
noted but not solved by Jeffrie Murphy, Kant’s Theory of Punishment, 87 COLUM.L.REV.
509, 519-524 (1987) and by ALLEN D. ROSEN, KANT’S THEORY OF JUSTICE 85-87 (1993).
109

RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY, supra note 7, at 7; see also RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra

note 7, at 47-54. I doubt whether a person who is reasonable in Rawls’s political sense is
necessarily reasonable in the prudential sense that the law requires. Ripstein assumes that
the two senses of reasonableness are intimately linked. I will not pursue the question
further here.
110

RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY, supra note 7, at 134. While this passage may be

reminiscent of Hegel’s view that the criminal wills his own punishment, its emphasis on
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Various doctrinal consequences are said to flow from this understanding of criminal law,
including a doctrine of fault:

Intent or recklessness is an essential element of core areas of criminality because
a person must be aware that the rights of others are in jeopardy if his action is to
count as … a substitution [of private rationality for public reasonableness].111

For this argument to work, Ripstein must show both that subjective fault is a satisfactory
standard for core criminal offenses and that subjective fault does not in itself convert noncriminal wrongs into criminal offenses. I want now to argue that his argument fails on
both counts, and thus to suggest that the doctrinal consequence (subjective fault) does not
flow directly from the normative principle (protecting and vindicating fair terms of social
cooperation). Consider, again, the fault requirement for sexual assault and its
relationship to the defense of mistaken belief in consent. What is wrong about a sexual
assault is not that the accused had made sexual contact with the complainant. It is the

the public aspect of crime and punishment distinguishes it from Hegel’s more
metaphysical account. Compare id. at 183-187 with G.W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF
RIGHT ¶¶90-102 (T.M. Knox trans. 1952) (1821) and with BRUDNER, UNITY, supra note
7, at 231-235; see also Ripstein, Authority, supra note 41, at 34-5.
111

RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY, supra note 7, at 134.
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fact that the conduct was non-consensual or unwanted by the complainant.112 Thus, one
would expect the prosecution to be required to demonstrate not only that the complainant
did not consent but that the accused was in some way at fault in failing to recognize the
absence of consent. So an accused who asserts that he did not realize that the
complainant was not consenting — the “defense” of mistaken belief in consent — is, in
effect, asserting that he lacked the required fault element.113
But what kind of mistake is necessary for acquittal? Is it enough that the accused
subjectively believed that the complainant consented; that is, does the prosecution have to
prove knowledge of lack of consent? Or must the mistake be reasonable; that is, does the
prosecution have to prove only that the accused’s mistake would not have been made by
a reasonable person? Or is there any justification for having no fault element at all with
respect to the victim’s non-consent? Given Ripstein’s claim about the centrality of
subjective fault to criminal liability, one would expect him to argue for some version of
subjective fault. But that is not what he does. Instead, he argues that fair terms of social
cooperation require that a mistake as to consent should only be a defense to sexual assault
if it is reasonable:
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I refer to adult complainants only. Sexual offenses against children do not

depend on absence of consent.
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Compare FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 35, at 696-7; R.
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[Like certain other activities,] sexual intercourse is essentially consensual;
nonconsensual sexual intercourse is rape. To say that these activities are
essentially consensual is to make a claim about their legal status: Those who
engage in them are not engaged in self-regarding activities in which they need to
take care not to accidentally impinge on the rights of others. Instead, they are
engaged in activities that are legitimate only with, indeed because of, the
voluntary participation of others. Those who fail to properly check for consent
cannot have made an inadvertent mistake, because they intend to engage in a
consensual activity.114

While this argument seems compelling, it is inconsistent with Ripstein’s earlier claim that
subjective fault is required for core criminal offenses. A man, however deluded, who
honestly believes that he has secured a woman’s consent is not “aware that the rights of
others are in jeopardy”115, nor has he chosen the consequence of his action;116 it is
precisely his delusion that makes him unaware that others’ rights are in jeopardy and that
the consequence is going to come about.117
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RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY, supra note 7, at 204, original emphasis.
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Id. at 134.
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Perhaps aware of this difficulty, Ripstein attempts to reinforce his argument by
arguing that an unreasonable mistake about consent is a mistake of law which does not
exculpate. Ripstein takes consent to be public in that consent is established by external
manifestations such as words and gestures, rather than by what is going on in the victim’s
mind.118 Consequently, a mistake about consent is a mistake about a public fact:

If we understand the boundaries between persons in terms of reasonableness, the
person who makes an unreasonable mistake has made a mistake about the rights
of others. The mistake is not simply about how those rights apply in a given case:
It is a mistake about the kind of thing that counts as consent. Those who make
reasonable mistakes, by contrast, make mistakes about how rights apply in a
given situation; as a result, their mistakes are mistakes only of fact.119

But this argument surely proves too much, in that it conflates mistakes by the accused,
which affect culpability, with mistakes by the complainant,120 which cannot on their own
make the accused culpable (at least until the complainant makes sufficient public
manifestations of non-consent). Indeed, it would be more accurate to say that in
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Ripstein’s account, where the victim mistakenly consents, the accused has made no
mistake at all:

If the accused’s belief about consent was reasonable in the requisite sense, then
the victim has consented. If it was unreasonable, there is no consent.121

This formulation eliminates the possibility of a reasonable mistake by the accused
altogether: once the prosecution has established non-consent in the proper public sense,
there is nothing the accused can do to exonerate himself. The offense of sexual assault
thereby becomes one of strict liability: once the prosecution has established non-consent,
any mistake must be unreasonable, and the prosecution is not required to prove any form
of fault. And strict liability is, in Ripstein’s view, an unfair division of risk.
Even if Ripstein’s argument concerning mistake of law were accepted, it would
be the beginning, not the end, of an argument for culpability. The doctrine that mistakes
of law do not excuse is subject to numerous exceptions and fails to identify its own
rationale.122 As Fletcher has argued,123 the question should not be whether a mistake is
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Id. at 202.
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See HALL, supra note 14, at 346-57; Paul K. Ryu & Helen Silving, Error

Juris: A Comparative Study, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 421 (1957); Paul Matthews, Ignorance of
the Law is No Excuse? 3 LEG. STUD. 174 (1983); Bruce R. Grace, Ignorance of the Law
as an Excuse, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1392 (1986); Hamish Stewart, Mistake of Law under
the Charter, 40 CRIM. L. Q. 476 (1998) [hereinafter Stewart, Mistake].
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one of law or fact, but whether the mistake goes to the accused’s culpability. If the
mistake is one that negates culpability — that justifies or excuses the conduct — then the
accused ought to be acquitted, whether or not the mistake is better described as one of
law or one of fact. Or, as a neo-formalist might say, the question should be whether the
mistake is one which manifests disrespect for the agency of others;124 if not, it would be
an excuse. In the context of sexual assault, the claim that a mistake about consent is a
mistake of law is not the end of the analysis: the mistake must still be of a sort that is
culpable. Thus, to say that an unreasonable mistake about consent is a mistake of law
does not by itself advance Ripstein’s argument; he is thrown back on his argument about
what is culpable about this sort of mistake, an argument which, as we have seen, is
inconsistent with his claim about the function of fault in a system of criminal law.
It would be more plausible to say that the unreasonably mistaken accused is justly
held liable because he ought to have been aware that the complainant was not consenting;
or that sexual assault is such a serious crime that a change from subjective to objective
fault is desirable for educative and deterrent purposes; but these arguments would
evidently bring consequentialist considerations into the determination of legal doctrine,
and are therefore barred by Ripstein’s commitment to the neo-formalist style of legal
reasoning.
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FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 35, at 736-758; see also
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We need next to consider whether, on Ripstein’s account, punishment can be
confined to criminal conduct. Anglo-American law standardly does not punish torts,
breaches of contract, or non-criminal invasions of property rights; while punitive
damages may on occasion be awarded, their rationale remains elusive,125 and there is no
private law equivalent of criminal sanctions such as imprisonment or probation. For
Ripstein, criminal punishment is triggered by substitutions of private rationality for
public reasonableness. But such substitutions are in no way limited to the criminal realm.
Negligent conduct might be intentional in the sense that the defendant knows that he or
she is falling below a standard of care. Breach of contract is probably intentional as
often as not. Indeed, an intentional breach of contract provides a particularly good
ground for testing Ripstein’s distinction between criminal and private law because it
frequently involves precisely the same substitution of private rationality for public
reasonableness: the seller decided not to deliver the goods that the purchaser agreed to
buy for $10 apiece because the market price has risen to $20, and so pursues his private
ends rather than vindicating the fair terms of cooperation expressed in the contract. Why
does that not make the seller a criminal? Ripstein argues that “intentionally breaching a
contract does not constitute a crime because both parties to the contract have already
consented to treat its subject matter as tradeable.”126 This explanation will not do: the
parties to a contract are of course dealing with a subject matter which the law considers
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tradeable or alienable, but in a contract the seller has, precisely, given up his or her right
to trade it elsewhere or, put another way, has agreed not to trade it. The buyer has
acquired a right for which the seller shows disrespect by not honoring the agreement.
There are, of course, many good reasons for not criminalizing breaches of
contract. Breaches of contract typically do not cause the harm that crimes cause; they can
typically be adequately compensated for by an award of damages; they do not usually
involve morally repugnant behavior; there is no reason to think that the costs involved in
the criminal prosecution of breaches of contract would have any corresponding social
benefits. But for Ripstein to invoke any of these would once again involve giving up the
apparently close connection between principle and doctrine on which his account
depends — that is, the claim that the principles he begins with can, on their own, deliver
a clear set of doctrines about which wrongs are crimes and which are not.
Yet there is something attractive and important about a neo-formalist startingpoint such as Ripstein’s. It is the notion that the core of criminal liability concerns
conduct that involves a particular kind of wrong to others, a wrong that the compensatory
remedies of private law cannot fully recognize. The pragmatist accepts this insight, but is
not thereby committed to the idea that intentional wrongdoing is the only way of
committing such a wrong, or that all intentional wrongdoings are such wrongs.
Sometimes mere negligence can be criminal, where the stakes for the victim are high
enough; and there is no way to assess whether the stakes are high enough without
measuring the consequences of different kinds of behavior.127 Sometimes intentional
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wrongdoing is not criminal, for a great variety of reasons which again typically cannot be
captured without some sense of the consequences of treating those wrongs through the
criminal justice system rather than with other legal instruments.
Principles provide reasons, occasionally decisive reasons, for or against doctrines;
but they typically do not have enough power to determine legal doctrines. When
supporting one doctrine over another, neo-formalists tend to over-state the power of their
principled reasons: they tend to represent possible doctrinal consequences as necessary
doctrinal consequences of principle. While it is always possible that someone, someday,
will persuade us that negligence (or strict liability) must flow from principle, or that
criminal fault must be subjective (or objective), the discussion in this part of this article is
meant to show that no neo-formalist has done so yet.

C. Recapitulation
In this part of the article, my purpose has not been to argue for or against any particular
legal doctrine proposed by Ripstein, Dworkin, Epstein, or any other theorist mentioned
above. My purpose has been rather to show that the doctrines do not flow inexorably
from the theorist’s normative premises. The claim that the standard of liability in tort
should not negate the concept of human agency is consistent with a variety of fault
standards; the claim that criminal law should punish wilful departures from the fair terms
of social cooperation is consistent with a variety of fault standards for core criminal
offenses, and does not in itself demand that criminal liability be limited to these core
offenses. The neo-formalist picture of human agency is the correct starting-point for
many doctrinal problems, for without this principled starting-point it is often unclear why
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we are bothering with law at all. But principles do not get us very far: they act as a rather
loose constraint on the doctrines that a court or a legislature might choose to define the
rights and duties of individuals. The choice among the various doctrines that are
consistent with principle depends on many factors, most notably the impact of legal
doctrine on the achievement of desirable outcomes.

IV.

RESPONSES TO DOCTRINAL INDETERMINACY

So far I have argued that accounts of tort and criminal law containing a certain liberal
conception of the person do not deliver determinate doctrinal answers to very basic legal
questions. In particular, the most fundamental question of tort and criminal law — the
standard of fault applicable to the defendant — can be answered in several ways
consistent with that liberal conception of the person. It is therefore entirely legitimate for
a legal decision-maker to appeal to consequences in choosing one doctrine over another.
In this part of the article, I describe four responses to the claim that doctrine is
indeterminate. The first — Ronald Dworkin’s “right answers” thesis — rejects the claim.
The second, third, and fourth accept the claim but differ in their response. The approach
of economic analysis of law is to remedy indeterminacy by bringing to bear a value
external to the law: economic efficiency or wealth maximization. The Critical Legal
Scholars are also quite happy to bring external values to bear, but at least in recent years
have been uncertain about what those values might be. Finally, the principled
consequentialism that I adopt in this article accepts that legal doctrine cannot be
determinately derived from or related to the principles that underlie the law, and proposes
that doctrine can be made determinate by considering the consequences of adopting one
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doctrine over another to the extent that pursuing those consequences is consistent with
principle.

A.

Right Answers?

A consequence of the claim that principle does not determine doctrine is that a principled
legal decision-maker who is in a position to make doctrine has the freedom to choose
among various doctrines. One might think of a legislator contemplating a change to
some area of the law, a judge deciding what Hart would have called a case in the
penumbra,128 or a judge in a new constitutional order interpreting the language of a
recently enacted bill of rights.129 If the consequences of principles for doctrine are
indeterminate, then a decision-maker in this situation is entitled to make any of several
possible decisions, none of which will be wrong in principle.
Ronald Dworkin has argued that we should reject this model of decision-making
about doctrine on the ground that even in a hard case there is a right answer. This
argument, if correct, would be fatal to the pragmatic position I am trying to develop in
this article. Dworkin’s “right answer” thesis is developed with a negative argument
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Hart, Positivism, supra note 69, at 606-615.
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intended to demonstrate the implausibility of the “no-right-answer” thesis, and a positive
argument demonstrating how a judge goes about deciding a hard case. The negative
argument takes on several versions of the “no right answers” thesis and attempts to refute
each of them. I want to consider one of these versions, which is perhaps the most closely
related to the claim that doctrine is indeterminate and which Dworkin himself describes
as “the most influential”.130 This is the “argument from controversy”, or the claim that
“[i]f it is inherently controversial whether some party has a particular legal or political
right, then, according to this argument, it cannot be true that he has this right.”131
Dworkin approaches the argument from controversy indirectly, exposing and attacking
what he calls “the demonstrability thesis … [which] states that if a proposition cannot be
demonstrated to be true, after all the hard facts that might be relevant to its truth are either
known or stipulated, then it cannot be true.”132 Dworkin argues against the
demonstrability thesis, asserting that there exist both “hard facts,” to which the
demonstrability thesis may apply, and other facts, to which it certainly does not apply.
These other facts might include “moral facts” in the legal and political realm, and “facts
of narrative consistency” in the aesthetic realm.133 The demonstrability thesis thus
depends, Dworkin argues, on the implausible assumption that “there are no facts in the
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world but hard facts.”134 I am inclined to agree with Dworkin that there are facts of
several kinds and that the demonstrability thesis is therefore false. But refuting the
demonstrability thesis does not go very far to support the right answers thesis. If the
demonstrability thesis is true, then doctrine is indeterminate; but the falsity of the
demonstrability thesis does not entail the truth of the right answers thesis.135 Indeed, it is
not necessary to hold the demonstrability thesis to adopt the pragmatic approach; the
pragmatist would agree with Dworkin that there is no profound methodological
difference between science, history, and law, and that in none of these disciplines does
the mere fact of controversy prove that its propositions are indeterminate.136 Therefore,
the refutation of the demonstrability thesis contributes little if anything to Dworkin’s
right answers thesis.
Dworkin’s best argument against the “no right answer” thesis is not his attack on
the demonstrability thesis, but his positive claim that his theory of law as integrity
provides an account of legal decision-making that will generate right answers. As is
well-known, Dworkin argues that a legal decision-maker (a judge) approaching a hard
question with integrity works along two dimensions.137 The first is the “dimension of
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fit.” The judge must consider the possible answers to the hard question and determine
their compatibility with the existing law. Those answers that are sufficiently compatible
to count as an interpretation of past practice rather than as an invention pass the test of
fit.138 The second is the “dimension of justification.” The judge “must choose between
eligible interpretations by asking which shows the community’s structure of institutions
and decisions—its public standards as a whole—in a better light from the standpoint of
political morality.”139 The judge’s decision on both dimensions is one of principle, not
policy,140 and is to be made in accordance with the correct political morality. That is, the
judge is to make “decisions about what rights people have ... rather than decisions about
how the general welfare is best promoted”,141 and rights are generated from the liberal
egalitarian principle that persons are to be treated with equal concern and respect.142
This picture of judicial decision-making seems structurally sound. While
Dworkin’s over-arching political theory is controversial, one can imagine conducting a
basically similar exercise under the guidance of a different political theory. The
dimension of fit captures much of the lawyer’s common sense about the way the law is
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structured and the way new problems are assimilated to that structure,143 while the
dimension of justification provides a plausible description of the choice among
competing doctrines that fit. But the associated claim that there are right answers to
difficult questions of legal doctrine requires a further claim: that in every case one, and
only one, answer can satisfy both the dimension of fit and the dimension of justification.
If no answer survives, then too many constraints have been imposed on the judge, and
something must give way for a result to be reached: typically, one thinks of some
principle of political morality overcoming fit. If more than one answer survives, then
there is what Dworkin calls a “tie”144 and what I call a case of doctrinal indeterminacy.
Dworkin argues that in a sufficiently complex legal system “ties” between
doctrines will be rare because if the legal system is “thick with constitutional rules and
practices, and dense with precedents and statutes,”145 the probability that more than one
answer will fit is low; and if more than one answer does fit, the tie can be resolved on the
dimension of justification.146 The proposition that “ties” between doctrines are likely to
be common is not susceptible of proof in any logical sense; as Dworkin rightly says, the
proposition “is not an ordinary empirical question” and the likelihood that a “tie” will
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occur cannot be measured in any obvious way.147 I therefore offer three reasons to think
that ties may be more common than Dworkin believes.
Consider first the interpretive nature of reasoning about legal doctrine, on which
Dworkin rightly insists.148 A decision about which legal doctrine to adopt requires, in
Dworkin’s model, a judgment about how the doctrine fits with the existing practice and a
judgment about how to show the practice at its best in light of a moral and political
theory. But it is at least odd to describe an interpretive practice as having to issue a
correct answer. To see this oddness, consider the artistic analogies Dworkin is so fond
of. Dworkin asks us to think of the common law as a sort of chain novel: one novelist
writes the first chapter, a second novelist writes the second chapter, and so forth.149
Dworkin quite reasonably observes that if the authors behave with some sense of artistic
integrity, they will operate under certain constraints: “every novelist but the first ... must
decide what the characters are ‘really’ like; what motives guide them; what the point or
theme of the developing novel is; how far some literary device or figure, consciously or
unconsciously used, contributes to these”,150 and so forth. I do not propose to quarrel
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here with this picture of how the authors should operate;151 but notice that the “right
answers” thesis, as applied to this chain novel, implies that once the first chapter is
completed, the same novel will be written no matter what order the remaining authors
work in. If each author’s treatment of what has gone before is a matter of interpretation,
this conclusion is deeply implausible: a more natural interpretive conclusion would be
that the content of the chain novel will vary depending on the order in which the authors
work. It may be that the work will have integrity no matter what the order is, but that is
not the same thing as saying that the order does not affect the result. Each of the
alternative sequences would produce a different, yet equally sustainable, interpretation of
the first author’s starting point.

151

It has been pointed out that Dworkin presupposes a certain aesthetic of fiction

which in turn creates the constraints under which the novelists work. See FISH, DOING
WHAT COMES NATURALLY, supra note 2, at 95; Costas Douzinas, Shaun McVeigh, &
Ronnie Warrington, Is Hermes Hercules’ Twin? Hermeneutics and Legal Theory, in
READING DWORKIN CRITICALLY 123, 136 (Alan Hunt ed. 1992). This aesthetic is
analogous to the political theory under which the judges in law as integrity operate, and
Dworkin of course recognizes that a judge who operates under a political morality
different from his will reach a different result in a hard case: see DWORKIN, LAW’S
EMPIRE, supra note 7, at 256. But I am concerned with the possibility of disagreement
within a given political morality.
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Or consider a different artistic analogy. There are many recordings of
Beethoven’s C minor piano sonata, op. 111.152 The text of the sonata, unlike the text of
Dworkin’s chain novel, is reasonably fixed. But each recorded performance is different
from the others: the differences include matters of tempo, rhythmic phrasing, dynamic
contrast, pedalling, emphasis, and articulation. All of the recordings pass a test of fit:
they show sufficient respect for the printed score.153 On the dimension of justification, I
assume good faith, in that each pianist offers an interpretation which, by his or her lights,
makes the work the best it can be. None of the interpretations seems wrong in any
meaningful sense: they are just different from each other. Indeed, to claim that one is
right and the others are wrong, or to claim that in principle a Herculean pianist could
produce the definitive interpretation of the sonata, would be to stultify the development
of any given pianist’s musicianship, bringing the process of interpretation to an end.
Now, the law is neither literature nor music. A performance of a Beethoven piano
sonata may make the world richer or poorer from an aesthetic point of view, but it will
not send anyone to jail or require anyone to pay damages. In contrast, at the end of
litigation, there will be a successful and a disappointed litigant and perhaps a new legal
rule; at the end of a legislative process, a new or revised statute affecting citizens’ rights
and duties will be in place. In these situations, it will hardly do to assert that,

152

For the record, my collection of recordings includes performances of

Beethoven’s op. 111 by Ashkenazy, Backhaus, Barenboim, Brendel, Buchbinder, Gilels,
Goode, Gould, Guller, Kempff, Kovacevich, Kuerti, Pollini, Richter, and Schnabel.
153

Though there are some startling wrong notes in Schnabel’s 1942 recording.
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aesthetically speaking, one answer is as good as another. There is some sense in which
citizens have a right to wise legislation; certainly a civil litigant has a right to win if the
law is on his or her side; and an accused person has a right not to be punished if his or her
guilt cannot be established. Dworkin relies on the idea that people have rights to support
the right answer thesis; and his reliance on our understanding of rights leads to a second
reason for thinking that “ties” may be relatively common. Dworkin expresses the core of
the right answer thesis as follows:

… even when no settled rule disposes of the case, one party may nonetheless have
the right to win. It remains the judge’s duty, even in hard cases, to discover what
the rights of the parties are, not to invent new rights retrospectively.154

If the litigants in a hard case have no right to a particular decision, it is both
pointless and unfair to let the case between them be decided by a controversial (or
for that matter uncontroversial) decision about the rights they have.155

The argument is an attractive one: if we are to say that a litigant has a right, then there
must be a right answer in his or her case; otherwise, he or she did not have a right to
begin with. In other words, the right answer thesis must be true for a litigant to have a
right to win. But this argument, though attractive, is not valid: it does not support but

154

DWORKIN, RIGHTS, supra note 7, at 81.

155

Id. at 281.
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presupposes the right answer thesis. If the right answer thesis is correct, then a litigant
has a right to a decision reflecting the right answer. But the fact that a decision must be
made in no way establishes that there is one right decision; and if there is no right answer,
then a litigant has only a right to a “choice … made honestly and in a cool moment, free
from bias or passion or zeal.”156 Thus, the idea that people have rights says nothing in
itself about whether there will be a right answer in a difficult case, and is no obstacle to
the thought that “ties” may be relatively common.157
Consider, third and finally, the strangely subordinate place of legislation in
Dworkin’s account.158 Dworkin does offer a principle of integrity in legislation which is
different from the principle of integrity in adjudication and which apparently offers the
legislature more room to maneuver than the courts.159 But one might think that the right
answer thesis does not permit this distinction. Suppose a court deciding a hard case
(whether at common law or in the interpretation of a statute) decides that a particular
legal doctrine should be in force. For concreteness, suppose the case in question is

156

Id. at 279.

157

Compare Hilary Putnam, Replies, 1 LEGAL THEORY 69, 76 (1995): “Dworkin

writes as if the existence of a correct answer simply followed from the fact that legal
statements and ethical statements are truth-value worthy.”
158

On the subordinate place of legislation in contemporary legal theory more

generally, see JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999).
159

DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 7, at 176-224.
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Henningsen,160 where the court had to consider whether a warranty guaranteeing
replacement of defective parts and excluding all other forms of liability was effective in a
case where a motor vehicle had been effectively destroyed by an apparent manufacturing
defect. The court held that neither the manufacturer nor the dealer could rely on the
warranty, and that the purchasers of the vehicle could rely on an implied warranty of
merchantability against the manufacturer and the dealer. This result was achieved despite
the absence of “any statute, or … any established rule of law, that prevented the
manufacturer from standing on the contract.”161 Now, suppose the legislature doesn’t
like the result, and therefore enacts a statute reversing the result; that is, the legislature
decides to impose a different legal doctrine. In particular, imagine that after Henningsen
the New Jersey legislature, in an effort to encourage purchasers to negotiate protection
from injury, or to protect dealers and manufacturers from liability, enacted a statute
abolishing the implied warranty and requiring courts to give effect to contractual
limitations of liability. There are three ways of understanding the rightness of the
legislature’s response to the court’s decision: (1) the legislative response is wrong; (2) the
court’s decision was right, but the legislative response is permissible because it is based
on a consideration that the court was barred from hearing; (3) both the original decision
and the legislative response are right in the sense that each is a permissible interpretation
of the demands of justice. The first understanding is of course always possible; the
positive supremacy of the legislature in non-constitutional matters does not mean that we

160

Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).

161

DWORKIN, RIGHTS, supra note 7, at 23.
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are bound, as citizens or as lawyers, to say that the legislature is always right. The third
understanding is not available to Dworkin because it is inconsistent with the right answer
thesis. Dworkin in fact adopts the second understanding,162 but I want to suggest that
there is a class of cases, including our hypothetical reversal of Henningsen, in which it is
not available to him. Legislatures make all sorts of policy decisions that are not usually
justiciable: whether to change a tax rate, whether to subsidize a particular activity,
whether to ratify a treaty. In such cases I have no quarrel with Dworkin’s general
description of the difference between the legislative and the judicial role. But legislatures
also make decisions about questions of legal doctrine that would normally be justiciable:
they create, modify, and repeal rules of tort law, contract law, criminal law, and so forth.
In these cases legislatures ought, on Dworkin’s account, to be subject to the same
constraints of integrity and with the same attention to equal concern and respect as a
court. They therefore must reach the same decision as the court. If Dworkin’s right
answer thesis is correct, then a legislature which reverses a judicial decision must be
wrong—in the sense that its enactment does not reflect the best political justification for
the material (which now includes the court’s correct decision) that existed just before the
enactment.
If the “right answer” thesis has the implications for legislative action that I have
suggested, then some of Dworkin’s examples of integrity in legislation need to be
revisited. Consider the following:

162

DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 7, at 244; DWORKIN, RIGHTS, supra note

7, at 302-303.
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Suppose the legislature is persuaded that the standing scheme of accident law,
which allows people compensation for defective products only when the
manufacturer is negligent, is unjust, and therefore it proposes to enact a scheme of
strict liability for defective automobiles. Integrity would require it to enact strict
liability for all other products as well.163

The argument from integrity is appealing on its own terms; but if the right answer thesis
is correct, one must ask what business the legislature has in changing the standard of tort
liability in the first place. Assuming that standard to have been determined judicially,
and assuming the right answer thesis is correct, the legislature must be wrong in
proposing to change it. But if the legislature’s view about the proper doctrine satisfies
the requirements of integrity, then it would have been proper for the court to have
adopted it, and hence no more wrong than the answer that the court did adopt.
The point might also be put this way: if, as Dworkin argues, people have rights,
and if these rights are consistent with the demands of integrity, it is hard to see how those
rights can ever be changed in a principled way. Once Hercules has told us the right
answers to all the hard cases, there is no more doctrinal work to be done by judges or by

163

DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 7, at 218. Boyle, supra note 7, at 507-

508, points out that Dworkin offers no reason to confine the scope of his tort principles to
the domain of product liability.
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legislatures. Surely Dworkin does not believe this; yet the right answer thesis, if taken
seriously, seems to drive us to this result.
A more natural understanding of the relationship between the court and the
legislature in a case of this sort is the following: unless the enactment is unconstitutional
(or otherwise grossly deficient) it is no less right or wrong than the decision it overturns.
So if the court had chosen a rule that was in substance the same as the new enactment,
that would not have been wrong either.
The “right answer” thesis in its positive form has, then, at least three flaws. It is
not supported by the analogy to artistic interpretation; it relies on a question-begging
argument about rights; and it demands an implausible account of the relationship between
the courts and the legislature. The “right answer” thesis need not trouble the pragmatist
or prevent him or her from drawing on other aspects of Dworkin’s account of legal
reasoning.

B. Economic Analysis of Law
Economic analysis of law, in its positive guise, helps us understand the effects of legal
doctrine on the behavior of individuals. In its normative guise, it offers a guide to the
choice of doctrine: the court should choose the legal rule that will maximize wealth164 or
some other measure of well-being.165 In its jurisprudential guise, it asserts that legal

164

POSNER, PROBLEMS, supra note 80, at 374; DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, LAW’S

ORDER: WHAT ECONOMICS HAS TO DO WITH LAW AND WHY IT MATTERS 44 (2000).
165

KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 6.
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doctrine is best understood as if it had been designed to maximize wealth.166 Economic
analysts are hostile to the idea of legal principle because they see legal concepts as mere
reflexes of other, more important, normative values.167 In this article, I focus on the
normative claim, which is said to remedy the indeterminacy that plagues other accounts
of doctrine.
I argue, first, that the normative claim does not in fact resolve the problem of
indeterminacy; and, second, that the normative claim is in any event unattractive.
1. The Indeterminacy of Wealth-Maximization
The normative claim of economic analysis of law states, in essence, that legal rules
should be chosen so as to maximize wealth, or to ensure that resources are allocated to

166

POSNER, PROBLEMS, supra note 6, at 358-61. With respect to tort law at least,

the jurisprudential claim has often been persuasively criticized. See, e.g., WEINRIB, supra
note 7, at 46-8; COLEMAN, PRACTICE, supra note 5, at 13-24. Recently, distinguished
economic analysts of law have tended to emphasize their positive and normative claims
while resiling from the jurisprudential claim: see KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 6, at 4;
and compare Arthur Ripstein, Too Much Invested to Quit, 20 ECON. & PHIL. 185 (2004)
(book review).
167

“Although there are other possible goals of judicial action besides efficiency

and redistribution, many of these (various concepts of ‘fairness’ and ‘justice’) are labels
for wealth maximization, or for redistribution in favor of powerful interest groups”:
POSNER, PROBLEMS, supra note 80, at 360.
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their highest-valued uses. For example, where the assignment of a property right is at
issue and there is reason to believe that Coasean bargaining will not occur, it is often
suggested that the right should be assigned to the party who values it most highly, as this
assignment will mimic the market outcome that would occur if the conditions for the
application of Coase Theorem were at least approximately satisfied.168 Or it is suggested
that a legal rule should be chosen to provide people with incentives to behave in a wealthmaximizing way.169 The standard of liability in tort law, for instance, should ensure that
parties (both plaintiffs and defendants) take all cost-justified precautions, but no more.170
Normative theory of this sort is attractive because it seems to offer a determinate
solution to some of the doctrinal problems which, as we have seen, cannot be determined
by liberal principles alone. But it is important to understand that this apparent
determinacy is an artifact of economic analysts’ casual and customary disregard of the
consequences of one of their own most important assumptions: that value depends on
willingness to pay. The basic point is straightforward. The efficient outcome cannot in
general be identified independently of the legal rule because the legal rule affect wealth
and therefore willingness to pay; consequently, it is not in general possible to determine

168

RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 58 (5th ed. 1998)

[hereinafter POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS]; COOTER & ULEN, supra note 63, at 5-7.
169

POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 168, at 179-224 (discussing tort

rules from a wealth-maximizing point of view).
170

SHAVELL, supra note 63, at 34; COOTER & ULEN, supra note 63, at 300-19.
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which legal rule maximizes wealth, ensures efficiency, or promotes any other economic
value. This “income effect” is a simple consequence of equating value with willingness
to pay and thus making it a function of ability to pay.171
To see this point, consider a standard type of nuisance case often employed to
illustrate the economic approach. Imagine a factory that produces a desirable

171

The income effect should not be confused with the endowment effect, though

both effects create indeterminacy in the normative recommendations often thought to
flow from the Coase theorem. The endowment effect occurs if the amount a person is
willing to pay at the margin to acquire an item is less than the amount he or she is willing
to accept to sell the item at the same margin. See Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit
Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STANFORD L. REV. 387, 401-421
(1981); DWORKIN, PRINCIPLE, supra note 7, at 238; Herbert Hovenkamp, Marginal
Utility and the Coase Theorem, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 783, 797-808; Daniel Kahneman,
Jack L. Knetch, and Richard H. Thaler, Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and
the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POLIT. ECON. 1325 (1990). In contrast, an income effect occurs
when a person’s demand schedule changes because his or her budget constraint changes.
See J.R. HICKS, VALUE AND CAPITAL 26-37 (2d ed. 1946); ANGUS DEATON & JOHN
MUELLBAUER, ECONOMICS AND CONSUMER BEHAVIOR 35-6 (1980); Kennedy, CostBenefit Analysis, supra, at 422-429. Income and endowment effects are independent of
each other: either one may occur without the other. In my view, in any situation where
valuable property rights are at stake, income effects are likely to be much more
significant than endowment effects.
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consumption good and smoke. The factory’s neighbors dislike the smoke. The factory is
willing to pay, if necessary, to continue producing the consumption good, and the
neighbors and are willing to pay, if necessary, to abate the smoke. The Coase theorem
tells us that, if transactions costs are negligible, it doesn’t matter what the legal rule
regarding the smoke is. Suppose the factory values the right to produce smoke more than
the neighbors value clean air. Then, Coasean analysis tells us, even if the neighbors
obtain a court order enjoining the production of smoke, the factory will pay the
neighbours to give up their rights under the injunction. Either way, pollution will
continue. Suppose, conversely, that the neighbors value clean air more than the factory
values the right to produce smoke. Then even if the neighbors are unable to obtain a
court order enjoining the production of smoke, they will pay the factory to cease its
emissions. Either way, emissions will cease. It is the parties’ valuations, not the legal
rule, that determine the outcome. The implication for legal decision-making is that if
transactions costs are substantial, so that bargaining after the court’s decision is unlikely
to occur, the court should try to allocate the right to control the factory’s emissions to the
party who values it most.172
But this analysis ignores income effects. The right to control a factory’s
emissions is very valuable; consequently, the ownership of the right is likely to affect the

172

This example is quite standard: see, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 164, at 39-40;

HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 203-7 (1978).
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neighbours’ willingness to pay for clean air. If clean air is a normal good,173 the
neighbours will be willing to pay more for any given unit of clean air if they win the
injunction than if they lose. Thus, even with zero transactions costs, we can expect less
pollution if the neighbors have the property right. It is not possible to determine the
“most efficient” allocation of the property right because the efficient allocation of
resources varies with the allocation of the property right. A fortiori, the outcome with no
transactions costs gives the court no guidance as to the proper solution when transactions
costs are substantial.174
A similar point might be made about choice of doctrine in tort law. A change in
the legal rule—say, moving from fault-based liability to strict liability—will affect the
cost of engaging in various activities, reducing the wealth of some and increasing the
wealth of others, thereby changing the efficient outcome. One might anticipate that a

173

For a normal good, the quantity demanded at a given price increases when

income rises; for an inferior good, the quantity demanded at a given price decreases when
income rises. See DEATON & MUELLBAUER, supra note 171, at 43-6. It seems unlikely
that clean air is an inferior good, but even if it is, the main point made in the text is,
mutatis mutandis, still valid: the level of pollution will depend on the assignment of the
property right at issue because that assignment will affect the parties’ wealth and
therefore their demand for goods, whether those goods are normal or inferior.
174

For a formal analysis of the situation outlined here, see Hamish Stewart,

Wealth Effects and the Coase Theorem (2003) (unpublished manuscript on file with the
author).
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change from fault to strict liability would increase the wealth of people who have reasons
to engage in risky activities, and thereby increase the overall level of these activities;
though one could not be confident of this conclusion without a full theoretical and
empirical analysis.175
Changes to the doctrines of the criminal law would have to be analyzed in the
same manner. Economic analysis of law treats the criminal law as yet another policy tool
for achieving an efficient allocation of resources; yet, because of the wealth effect, the
efficient outcome will vary as criminal law rules change, just as the efficient outcome
varies when tort law rules change. If conduct should be defined as criminal only when it
is not wealth-maximizing,176 then an unwanted sexual encounter becomes a sexual assault
only when the losses it imposes on the victim exceed the benefits it generates for the
assailant. On this view, the fault element of the offence should be set, as far as possible,
so as to make wealth-reducing sexual interactions into crimes and wealth-enhancing

175

Existing economic analysis of tort law tend implicitly to assume away the

wealth effect and thus avoid this question altogether. For instance, in Shavell’s model of
accidents, the behavior of potential tortfeasors and potential victims is driven by the costs
associated with accidents and with precautions; but those costs are not themselves a
function of the tort rule chosen. See SHAVELL, supra note 63, at 32-46. This approach
amounts to assuming away the wealth effect. This point is not meant as a criticism of
Shavell’s analysis: there is, of course, nothing wrong with assuming away the wealth
effect for the purpose of investigating other effects.
176

Compare KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 6, at p. 320 n. 54.
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sexual interactions into innocent conduct.177 But the choice of fault requirement will
itself change the wealth of potential victims and potential assailants. The subjective fault
standard favors potential assailants by effectively reducing the value of victims’ property
rights in their own bodies; the objective standard favors potential victims by
strengthening their property rights. The more valuable the victims’ property rights, the
wealthier potential victims will be, and the less likely any given assault will be wealthmaximizing; consequently, the wealth-maximizing level of assaults will be lower under
the objective standard than under the subjective standard. Wealth-maximization cannot
determine which doctrine supports the efficient outcome because that outcome depends
on the doctrine. The problem is quite general: the economic approach cannot make the
allocation of a property right or the choice of doctrine in any area of law determinate.178

177

See, e.g., Jeffrey S. Parker, The Economics of Mens Rea, 79 VIRGINIA L. REV.

741 (1993). Parker argues that the economic function of mens rea is to reduce
overdeterrence of activities defined as “crimes” by ensuring that punishment is inflicted
only when the actor’s costs of determining whether what he is doing is a crime are zero
— i.e., he knows what he is doing — or quite low — i.e., he could easily determine what
he is doing. If punishment is inflicted without reference to fault — i.e., whether or not it
is costly for the actor to determine what he or she is doing — there will tend to be
overdeterrence in that actors will spend too much to find out what they are doing.
178

effect”:

Dworkin makes this point very clearly without actually using the term “income
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The way in which the income effect makes some of the normative
recommendations of economic analysis of law indeterminate is so obvious — and, at a
theoretical level, so well-recognized179 — that is it astonishing to see it so frequently

If A is B’s slave he may not be able to buy back the right to his labor;
although if he were not B would not be able to buy that right from him. If
economic analysis makes someone’s initial right to his own labor depend upon
whether he would purchase he right if assigned to another, that right cannot be
“derived” from economic analysis unless we already know who initially has the
right. This appears to be a serious circle. We cannot specify an initial allocation
of rights unless we answer questions that cannot be answered unless an initial
allocation of rights is specified.
DWORKIN, PRINCIPLE, supra note 7, at 253.
179

See, among others, Peter L. Swan, The Coase Theorem and ‘Sequential’

Pareto Optimality, 51 ECON. RECORD 268, 270 (1975); Yew-Kwang Ng, Again on
Externalities and Liability Rules: A Reply 53 ECON. RECORD 542 (1977); Robert Cooter,
The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 15 (1982) [hereinafter Cooter, Cost]; Richard D.
McKelvey and Talbot Page, Taking the Coase Theorem Seriously, 15 ECON. & PHIL. 235,
238-241 (1999); POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 168, at 56; Guido Calabresi
and A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View
of the Cathedral, 85 HARV.L.REV. 1089, 1095-1096 (1972); C. Edwin Baker, The
Ideology of the Economic Analysis of Law, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 12-22 (1975); Stewart
Schwab, Coase Defends Coase: Why Lawyers Listen and Economists Do Not, 87
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disregarded. Posner dismisses it as “a technical difficulty”180 while Coase comes close to
denying its existence altogether.181 But these responses really will not do. If value is
based on willingness to pay, then income effects must be central, because they affect
willingness to pay.
The income effect is just one manifestation of a more general problem. This
problem is, once again, well-understood by economists but largely disregarded by
economic analysts of law: in a normative framework where satisfaction of preferences is
taken as the supreme value, there is no way to measure “wealth” or “income”
independently of a set of prices, and since, in general, prices will change when property
rights are re-allocated and legal rules are changed, there is no general way to compare the

MICH.L.REV. 1171, 1179-84 (1989) (book review); Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, Property
Rights and Liability Rules: The Ex Ante View of the Cathedral, 100 MICH.L.REV. 601,
613 (2001); KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 6, at 36. See also Robert D. Cooter, Coase
Theorem, in THE WORLD OF ECONOMICS 51 (John Eatwell, Murray Milgate, & Peter
Newman eds, 1991) (stating that the Coase theorem shows that “the initial allocation of
legal entitlements does not matter from an efficiency perspective”, not that the final
outcome does not vary with the initial allocation of legal entitlements).
180

RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 71 n. 48 (1981).

181

COASE, supra note 94 , at 170-179. One comprehensive introduction to

economic analysis of law ignores the wealth effects of reassigning property rights
altogether: see FRIEDMAN, supra note 164.
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“wealth” of a society before and after such a change.182 Thus, the criterion of wealthmaximization is incoherent on its own terms.
2. The Normative Failures of Economic Analysis of Law
If wealth-maximization is an incoherent normative standard, it might be argued that
normative economic analysis should focus directly on a normative value that would not
be vulnerable to changes in legal rules. Rather than understanding “efficiency” as
wealth-maximization, perhaps we should understand “efficiency” as the maximization of
an aggregate of well-being. The classical economists, for instance, treated “utility” as a
measure of subjectively experienced happiness or desire-satisfaction, and treated the
aggregate of everyone’s utility as the normative objective of public policy.183 Despite

182

See ROBIN BOADWAY & NEIL BRUCE, WELFARE ECONOMICS 262 (1984)

(outlining the restrictive assumptions necessary for the aggregation of individual
preferences into a measure of social welfare); DEATON & MUELLBAUER, supra note 171,
at 148-66; Allan M. Feldman, Welfare Economics, in THE WORLD OF ECONOMICS 713,
725 (John Eatwell, Murray Milgate, & Peter Newman eds, 1991) (“measuring the size of
the economic pie, or judging among divisions of it, leads to ... paradoxes and
impossibilities”); JOHN HICKS, WEALTH AND WELFARE 153-159 (1981); KAPLOW &
SHAVELL, supra note 6, at 36. This problem is evaded in an otherwise useful and nontechnical introduction to economic analysis: see FRIEDMAN, supra note 164, at 18-21.
183

1957).

Compare I.M.D. LITTLE, A CRITIQUE OF WELFARE ECONOMICS 6-10 (2d ed.
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cogent objections to the classical utility concept, dating back at least as far as the
1930s,184 some economic analysts continue to rely on a measure of value that is in
principle akin to the classical utility concept.185 It is very doubtful that it is possible, in
principle or in practice, to construct a stable, measurable and interpersonally comparable
conception of subjectively experienced well-being along the lines of the classical utility
concept. But even if it were possible, there is an important and familiar objection to the
idea that efficiency, understood as the maximization of the sum of everyone’s
subjectively experienced well-being, should be the sole normative guide to social policy:

184

See, e.g., Lionel Robbins, Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: A Comment,

48 ECON. J. 635 (1938); PAUL A. SAMUELSON, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
90-100(1947). Dissatisfaction with the classical utility concept led to the development
and elaboration of the idea of Pareto efficiency. A social state x is Pareto superior to
social state y if at least one person prefers x to y and no person prefers y to x; x is Pareto
optimal if there is no social state that is Pareto superior to it. By referring only to
preferences, the Pareto concept avoids reliance on classical utility (or any other cardinal
measure of well-being) but is of very limited application because it says nothing by way
of comparing social states w and z if some individuals prefer w to z and other individuals
prefer z to w. See Amartya K. Sen, The Possibility of Social Choice, 89 AM. ECON. REV.
349, 352 (1999) [hereinafter Sen, Possibility].
185

See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 6; Hamish Stewart, Persons and Their
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there is no reason to think that such a measure would capture everything that is of
normative significance.186 This objection may be put in various forms, depending on
which other normative value one is concerned about: efficiency is concerned only with
the relationship between means and ends, and cannot take into account either the quality
of ends or the importance of a person’s ability to reflect on ends;187 it cannot take into
account anything that is valued for non-instrumental reasons;188 it cannot take into
account any value that cannot be traded off for another value;189 it is insensitive to
violations of right and so, to the extent that the protection of rights is valued intrinsically
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or instrumentally, it is unresponsive to that normative dimension;190 it is insensitive to the
distribution of income, unless by chance the distribution is itself something people have

190

DWORKIN, PRINCIPLE, supra note 7, at 242-243; Sen, Rights, supra note 27.

The clash between right and preference-based methods of evaluating social welfare was
made very pointed by the so-called “Sen paradox” in which the Pareto principle generates
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rights. See Amartya K. Sen, The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal, 78 J. POLIT. ECON.
152 (1970). The secondary literature on the Sen paradox is vast: three useful starting
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CHOICE (1985); Sen, Possibility, supra note 184, at 363-364. Kaplow and Shavell
present what is in effect an extension of the Sen paradox and argue that the conflict
between welfarism and other values is in itself a decisive reason for abandoning all
values other than the promotion of well-being. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Any
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those values; consequently, for their argument to succeed, Kaplow and Shavell need to
show not just that welfarism conflicts with other values but that welfarism is itself an
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preferences about;191 and it is not even a good measure of the things people need to
satisfy their basic needs.192
Thus, the indeterminacy of wealth-maximization is not just a technical issue but is
connected with the normative unattractiveness of economic analysis of law. Moreover, it
is not necessary to go outside the mainstream of economics to see this connection.
General equilibrium analysis is one of the great intellectual achievements of modern
economics; and one of the things that it tells us is that under the most standard
assumptions about preferences, technology, and markets, the final distribution of goods
depends on the initial allocation of resources.193 Hence the Coase theorem, if interpreted

attractive moral value: see Jules Coleman, The Grounds of Welfare, 112 YALE L.J. 1511,
1526-8 (2003) (book review); Stewart, Persons, supra note 185, at 6-8.
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Stewart, Persons, supra note 185, at 23.
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the conditions for the existence of a market-clearing equilibrium for all goods and
services. For the classic presentation of the problem and the solution, see Kenneth J.
Arrow & Gerard Debreu, Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy, 22
ECONOMETRICA 265 (1954); for less technical overviews and presentations, see FRANK
HAHN, General Equilibrium Theory, in EQUILIBRIUM AND MACROECONOMICS 72 (1984);
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strongly to mean that the initial allocation of a property right does not affect the
allocation of resources, is false. Closely connected with the general equilibrium research
program was the effort to analyze the normative properties of equilibria using preferencebased measures such as the Pareto criterion.194 This effort has shown that a satisfactory
money measure of economic welfare based on preferences, such as Posner’s wealthmaximization, can only be constructed on very restrictive assumptions about preferences.
If we take these bodies of scholarship seriously, as we should, we cannot accept the
proposition that economic efficiency by itself can capture all the normatively significant
features of the law.

KENNETH J. ARROW, General Economic Equilibrium: Purpose, Analytic Techniques,
Collective Choice, in 2 COLLECTED PAPERS OF KENNETH J. ARROW: GENERAL
EQUILIBRIUM 199 (1983); VARIAN, supra note 172, at 136-96. The first theorem of
welfare economics states that under certain rather restrictive conditions, an equilibrium
(if it exists) is Pareto-efficient allocation; the second theorem of welfare economics states
that any given Pareto-efficient allocation can be achieved as an equilibrium by a suitable
redistribution of agents’ initial endowments. See GERARD DEBREU, Valuation
equilibrium and Pareto optimum, in MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS: TWENTY PAPERS OF
GERARD DEBREU 98 (1983); VARIAN, supra note 172, at 147.
194

A weak version of the Coase theorem, which states that the final allocation of

resources is efficient regardless of the initial allocation of property rights, remains true
but indistinguishable from the main theorems of welfare economics stated in note 193
supra: see Cooter, supra note 179.
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Finally, and perhaps most decisively, the relentlessly aggregative structure of
wealth or utility maximization is normatively unattractive because it requires the
effective disappearance of the individual interests that made maximization of a sum of
values a plausible normative goal in the first place. To maximize wealth (or utility) is to
maximize the sum of every individual’s wealth (or utility). In the aggregate, individual
persons appear only as locations for the accumulation of wealth or utility, not as
individual holders of wealth or utility, much less as agents or as bearers of rights.195
Thus, their individual interests are submerged. It makes no difference to the aggregate if
an equal amount of wealth is taken from one and given to another. Furthermore, if taking
everything from one person will, for some reason, increase the aggregate of wealth, the
wealth-maximizer would have to support that change, regardless of its effect on the one.
Indeed, if taking all resources from everyone except one person and giving them all to
that one person one would, for some reason, increase the aggregate, the wealth maximizer
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This is the point of Rawls’s famous observation that “Utilitarianism does not

take seriously the distinction between persons.” RAWLS, JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 24; see
also H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM 98-99 (1982); Stewart, Persons, supra note 185,
at 26-31; Williams, supra note 26, at 108-18; Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams,
Introduction: Utilitarianism and Beyond, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 1, 4-5
(Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams, eds., 1982); JOHN RAWLS, The Independence of
Moral Theory, in COLLECTED PAPERS 286, 295-301 (Samuel Freeman ed. 1999). Rawls’s
observation applies a fortiori to wealth maximization, where what is measured is nothing
of direct normative interest but an instrument for well-being.
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would have to support that change as well. Yet wealth and utility are normative concepts
that are of interest only insofar as they pertain to individuals. An aggregate of wealth,
apart from its assignment to particular persons, is of no normative interest; an aggregate
of utility has no meaning apart from its assignment to particular persons. Thus, even
within economic analysis of law, there is no reason to accumulate wealth unless
individual persons are taken seriously. The exclusively aggregative focus of wealth or
utility maximization does not take individuals seriously and so is inconsistent with the
normative reasons for taking wealth or utility seriously in the first place.
The normative unattractiveness of the aggregative structure of wealth- or utilitymaximization is most obvious in the economic analysis of crime. As noted above, there
is no distinctive category of “crime” in economic analysis; a “crime” is simply an
inefficient behavior that the state tries to deter with penal sanctions. The harm to the
victim, or the violation of the victim’s rights, counts only to the extent that it detracts
from the aggregate of wealth or utility; the harm or the wrong is not itself a reason to
prevent the conduct that generates the harm, as the harm might be outweighed by benefits
to others. The victim’s role in the analysis is to act merely as a location for a particular
consequence. Yet, unless the victim matters in a larger sense than this — unless there is
a reason to be concerned about the loss to the victim apart from its contribution to the
aggregate of wealth or utility — or, indeed, unless there is a reason to care about the
benefit to the accused apart from its contribution to the aggregate — the aggregate itself
is of no normative interest.
Neither of my criticisms of wealth-maximization is meant to suggest that
economic analysis has no normative value; positive economic analysis is central to any
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understanding of the effects of legal rules on the social world, and is therefore important
in making informed normative choices between legal rules. The point is simply that
economic analysis is not normatively self-sufficient. If we want to make a principled
choice between fault and strict liability in tort law, or between subjective and objective
fault in criminal law, or among any competing doctrines in any area of the law, we need
to understand what economic analysis tells us about the likely effects of the choice, but
we cannot rely solely on economic analysis, any more than we could rely solely on the
neo-formalist conception of the person, to determine the doctrine.

C. Critical Legal Studies
Much of what I have said to this point has a Critical Legal ring to it. The observation that
doctrine is not a determinate consequence of principle has certainly been a commonplace
of Critical Legal scholarship,196 as has the critique of economic analysis197 and the claim
that the space left by indeterminacy is filled with ideological choices and the operations
of power.198 The critical legal scholars’ claims, if accepted, threaten the contemporary
liberal project because they undermine liberalism’s aspiration to be neutral between
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competing conceptions of the good; what it worse, these claims suggest that a legal
decision-maker who does not acknowledge them is systematically, if unconsciously,
misrepresenting what he or she is doing. The decision-maker is, in Kennedy’s phrase,
operating in “bad faith”.199 Do these claims also have force against the pragmatic picture
of legal reasoning that I seek to defend? It seems at first that they do. I have claimed that
principle creates a zone in which various doctrines may be chosen, and that the choice of
doctrine should depend on an assessment of the effectiveness of each doctrine in
achieving some favored state of affairs. The claims of the Critics might seem to
undermine the pragmatic model in two quite distinct ways. First, although “principle” as
I understand it is simultaneously less demanding procedurally and more demanding
substantively than the neutral principle of liberal political theory, it nonetheless is meant
to constrain legal argument in somewhat the same manner: it has the effect of ruling out
certain legal doctrines regardless of their beneficial effects. Second, even if principle is
satisfied, the assessment of effectiveness itself is surely fraught with the same ideological
struggle that principled legal argument is meant to suppress.200
But neither of these Critical points has much effect on the pragmatic model, for
the simple reason that the pragmatist can scarcely deny them without denying his or her
own pragmatism. The constraining effect of a principle expressed as generally as some
of those I have mentioned above (e.g., the principle of respecting agency in imposing
tortious or criminal liability) is generally so weak as to constitute no bar to the contention
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of ideology (understood as competition between implicit conceptions of the good), while
the constraining effect of principle expressed more strongly (e.g., the principled argument
for subjective fault in criminal liability) is never an absolute but always a possibly
temporary phenomenon. Similarly, at the stage of choosing among several principlerespecting doctrines, there is really no escape from the struggle of contending ideological
views. Any ideal which strove to contain this struggle would itself take on the status of a
principle whose consequences for doctrine could be no more determinate than those
liberal principles it supplemented.
But the pragmatist differs from the Critic in taking a more relaxed view of
ideological struggle in the determination of cases. First, while there is no logical reason
why one case rather than another should become a site for struggle, it has to be admitted
that, empirically speaking, most cases are not of this sort. They administer previouslyarrived-at ideologies and so postpone ideological struggle and allow us to get on with our
lives.201
Second, “ideological struggle,” understood as “open-ended disputes about the
basic terms of social life”202 need not be as disruptive as it sounds. Consider several
debates that have troubled courts, legislatures, and citizens: the criminalization of
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obscene expression,203 the legality of indefinite detention of suspected terrorists,204 the
permissibility of assisted suicide,205 and the definition of the proper standard for unfair
labor practices in collective bargaining.206 These are all, to be sure, “disputes about the
basic terms of social life.” The pragmatist does not expect them to go away merely
because he or she uses principled legal argument to assist in resolving them. The
persistence or recurrence of such disputes indicates only that they are important and
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difficult, not that their resolution in accordance with principle is impossible or that any
particular resolution is permanent. Nor does the fact that ideological struggle is pervasive
provide, in itself, a reason to adopt any particular ideology. The typical Critical Legal
Scholar is a leftist, but there is nothing in his or her method that would startle a fascist
like Carl Schmitt207 or a liberal like Richard Rorty:208 all three regard debate, or struggle,
over the basic terms of social life as central to politics, but each draws dramatically
different political conclusions from it.
Third, the fact that not all legal reasoning is principled does not mean that no legal
reasoning is principled; and the fact that principles themselves are infested with ideology
does not mean that they are not principles. The Critics and other critics have repeatedly
argued that liberalism’s claim to be neutral between substantive moral positions or
contending conceptions of the good or even between different religious beliefs is
impossible to achieve or a sham (or both).209 But if liberalism is understood not as
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demanding strict neutralism but as committing itself to certain principles that admittedly
exclude some forms of life, then the attack on neutrality has no force against
liberalism.210 If liberal principles were understood as substantive rather than neutral, then
the Critical attack would have to be directed at the desirability of the form of life
supported by those principles. It would be part of a debate over the basic terms of social
life, rather than a complaint that the debate was being avoided.
The question of the proper construction of liberalism is far too large to answer
properly in this article. But I will briefly indicate why the Critical program is less
threatening to law understood as part of a non-neutral liberal order than to law understood
in its neo-formalist guise as neutral mediator. The critique of liberal neutrality, in a
nutshell, is that liberalism cannot live up to its aspiration to neutrality among all possible
conceptions of the good because the very institutions of the liberal state through which
this aspiration is expressed favor some forms of life and disfavor others.211 The neoformalist response to this critique has been a kind of confession and avoidance: it is
conceded that liberalism favors some forms of life over others, but it is claimed that as
long as public policy is neutral in intention, regardless of its effects, the principle of
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liberal neutrality is respected.212 Now, this concession makes liberalism’s aspirations
weaker than they might have been; moreover, as an answer to those whose ways of life
are in fact destroyed by liberalism, it is not wholly satisfactory.213 A more forthright and
defensible response would be to admit the inevitable non-neutrality of liberalism and to
defend its attractive features.214 Whatever its flaws, I understand the basic principles
underlying the liberal legal order in this substantive manner. They include such obvious
features as representative democracy, basic political, economic, and conscientious
freedoms, a culture of respect for rights, and a substantial degree of tolerance. Our main
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grounds for finding a society with these features attractive are our experiences with it and
the alternatives to it. But ideological contention within such a society is to be expected
rather than avoided.
These three observations about ideological contention in law are meant to suggest
a more serious objection to Critical Legal Studies as a route to take in response to
doctrinal indeterminacy. That objection is simple: Critical Legal Studies offers no such
route because it provides no model of legal reasoning; and, however compelling its
picture of how we should live may be, the attractiveness of that picture is independent of
its critique of mainstream legal reasoning. I spell out this objection with reference to two
important statements of the Critical project.
1. Kennedy: The Retreat to Aesthetics
In his Critique of Adjudication, Duncan Kennedy associates himself with a leftwing/modernist/post-modernist agenda, or “left/mpm project”.215 The “left” part of this
project is “to change the existing system of social hierarchy, including its class, racial,
and gender dimensions, in the direction of greater equality and greater participation in
public and private government.”216 The “mpm” part has “the goal of achieving
transcendent aesthetic/emotional/intellectual experiences at the margins of or in the
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interstices of a disrupted rational grid.”217 The two projects share attitudes of
“oppositionism” and of “‘postness’”, i.e., “‘loss of faith’ ... toward the rationalizing,
universalizing claims and aspirations of modern elites ...”218 Kennedy, well aware of the
tension between the two parts of his project, nonetheless hopes that their encounter will
be fruitful.219
The principal focus of Kennedy’s Critique is not the left/mpm project itself, but
an obstacle to the project: contemporary American legal culture. Adopting the usual
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Critical view that the determination of legal rules is ideologically charged,220 Kennedy
diagnoses certain features of American adjudicative practice that derive from the desire
“to show that judges are not or should not be ideological actors, even though they are
unquestionably law makers.”221 He first identifies three characteristic postures that
judges adopt in dealing with the inescapably ideological character of adjudication.
“These are the postures of the constrained activist, the difference splitter, and the bipolar
judge.”222 The constrained activist does her best to develop an interpretation of the law
that will fit her ideology, but, if she fails, will submit to another interpretation.223 The
difference splitter tries to find a middle ground between contending ideologies: “He lets
ideologues decide him indirectly by setting up a choice and then refusing it by choosing
the middle.”224 The bipolar judge alternates between ideological positions, contributing
to the development of each but finally choosing neither.225
To the extent that these postures succeed in concealing the ideological character
of adjudication, current legal practice has three significant effects on “our … system of
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lawmaking through adjudication”.226 The “moderation effect … is the reduction of the
power of ideologically organized legislative majorities, and ideologically oriented highcourt judges, whether liberal or conservative, to bring about significant change in any
subject-matter area heavily governed by law.”227 The “empowerment effect” is “the
empowerment of the legal fractions of intelligentsias to decide the legal outcome of
ideological conflict among themselves”.228 The “legitimation effect” is “an increase in
the appearance of naturalness, necessity, and relative justice of the status quo, whatever it
may be, over what would prevail under legislative revision.”229 All three effects protect
the legal regime from ideological change, and the devices that judges use to conceal the
ideological character of adjudication are therefore crucial.
All of these effects combine to prevent the open contention of ideologies and to
support the ruling division between liberalism and conservatism, both of which are
committed to capital-L Liberalism, defined as “[a] larger unit … made up of the
theoretical commitments that liberalism and conservatism share, including rights,
majority rule, the rule of law, Judeo-Christian morality, and a regulated market economy
with safety nets.”230 A different practice of adjudication would, Kennedy speculates,
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reduce the moderation, legitimation, and empowerment effects, and thereby produce
different “political results,”231 perhaps including elements of the left/mpm project.232
One might expect all of this analysis to be followed by a call to political action,
perhaps by a claim that a left legal discourse could produce its own version of the three
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effects and thus support the left project that Kennedy began with.233 But, rather than
uttering such a call to action, Kennedy contents himself with a curious and unsatisfactory
aestheticism associated with the mpm part of his project, intended apparently to provoke
not political action but an emotional response rather than. The critique of rights, he says,
“is not about the question of how we ought to define rights but rather about how we
should feel about the discourse in which we claim them.”234 The mpm project, “rather
than putting a new theory in place, … looks to induce, through the artifactual
construction of the critique, the modernist emotions associated with the death of reason—
ecstasy, irony, depression, and so forth.”235 Similarly, the mpm understanding of the
state’s authority does not lead Kennedy to seek to use that authority in the pursuit of his
goals:

A left/mpm program for the transformation of society would have aims that could
not be simply imposed by law. First, the ability of the state qua state, the state
without “legitimacy,” to coerce obedience is obviously limited. Second, much of
the behavior a left/mpm program would like to change is so fine-grained, so much
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involved with “attitudes” and spiritual orientations to action, that it couldn’t
possibly be mandated in all its detail from above.
If it could, and people just obeyed a totalitarian code, the program would
have failed for the reason that the program aims at conversion to a kind of
antinomianism, rather than at obedience to correct thought. “The letter killeth …”
is not an entailment of postmodernism (there are none), but it is a core maxim of
left/mpm. A second core maxim is that we study state power to resist it, not to
seize it.236

At this point, the tension between the “left” and the “mpm” parts of Kennedy’s project
becomes irreconcilable. The leftist is bound to regard the post-modernist’s preoccupation
with aesthetics at best as a distraction from the project of advancing left goals through
law, and at worst as a self-defeating substitute for action.237 The post-modernist is bound

236

Id. at 271.
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Kennedy’s project is a sophisticated instance of the “politically paralyzing

skepticism” that leftist critics of post-modernism reject: see Terry Eagleton, Where Do
Postmodernists Come From?, in IN DEFENSE OF HISTORY (Ellen Meiksins Wood & John
Bellamy Foster eds. 1997) 17 at 24. Fredric Jameson’s early articulation of the postmodern aesthetic already contained a more positive political program than Kennedy’s
retreat to aestheticism: see Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of
Capitalism, 146 NEW LEFT REV. 53, 85-90 (1984); see also DAVID HARVEY, THE
CONDITION OF POSTMODERNITY 329-45 (1990); TAMAHANA, supra note 13, at 253-4.
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to regard the leftist’s commitments, to the extent that they depend on a master narrative
of equality or humanity, as naïve or irrational.238 For a legal decision-maker who is
trying to resolve a difficult doctrinal question, such as the proper fault requirement for the
offense of sexual assault, it hardly seems appropriate to take up a purely aesthetic
attitude; yet Kennedy’s postmodernism seems to leave him only weakly committed to the
values that might make one think such doctrinal questions were urgent in the first place.
There is nothing in Kennedy’s account to make the pragmatist abandon his or her
understanding of legal doctrine as the pursuit of desirable consequences within the
constraint of principle.
2. Unger: The Attack on Stability
Like Kennedy, Unger diagnoses a feature of American legal thought and sees it as
an obstacle to desirable change. Unger describes the dominant mode of American
academic-legal discourse as “rationalizing legal analysis”:

Rationalizing legal analysis is a way of representing extended pieces of
law as expressions, albeit flawed expressions, of connected sets of policies and
principles. It is a self-consciously purposive mode of discourse, recognizing that
imputed purpose shapes the interpretive development of law. Its primary
distinction, however, is to see policies of collective welfare and principles of

238

FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY, supra note 2, at 399; LYOTARD, supra
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moral and political right as the proper content of these guiding purposes. The
generalizing and idealizing discourse of policy and principle interprets law by
making sense of it as a purposive social enterprise that reaches toward
comprehensive schemes of welfare and right. Through rational reconstruction,
entering cumulatively and deeply into the content of law, we come to understand
pieces of law as fragments of an intelligible plan of life.239

Unger’s objection to rationalizing legal analysis is that it “helps arrest the dialectic
between the rights of choice and the arrangements that make individual and collective
self-determination effective”.240 The academic habit of using rationalizing legal analysis
rather than analogical reasoning has consequences analogous to Kennedy’s legitimation,
moderation, and empowerment effects:

Too much pretence of discovering the ideal conceptions ready-made and fully
potent within the existing law, and the legal analyst becomes a mystifier and an
apologist. Too much constructive improvement of the law as received
understanding represents it to be, and he turns into a usurper of democracy. In
fact, because the apologetic mystification may be so insecurely grounded in the
actual materials of law, both these countervailing perversions of rational
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reconstruction are likely to end in an unjustified confiscation of lawmaking power
by the analyst.241

Rationalizing legal analysis is contrasted with “the looser and more contextoriented analogical reasoning that continues to dominate … much of the practical
reasoning of lawyers and judges.”242 Analogical reasoning “refus[es] to climb up the
ladder of abstraction, generalization, and system”;243 it engages in a “dialectic between
ascription of purpose and classification of circumstance”;244 its “guiding interests or
purposes … are open-ended”;245 it is “noncumulative … because the guiding interests or
purposes do not move towards a system of axioms and inferences.”246 Because it lacks a
“drive toward systematic closure and abstraction”247, analogical reasoning is suited to a
world in which rationalizing legal analysis is replaced with “the idea of legal analysis as
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institutional imagination.”248 The exercise of this imagination would assist in the
construction of various “imagined futures” or “alternative conceptions of the desirable
sequel to social democracy as it is currently understood and practised”.249 Unger
considers three in particular. The first is “extended social democracy … animat[ed by]
the belief that the privileged area of experience is the life of the individual: the ability of
the individual to define and to execute his own life projects”;250 the second is “radical
polyarchy … [which] wants to devolve central state power to local or specialized
communities”;251 the third is “mobilizational democracy … [which] wants to heat politics
up, both the macropolitics of institutional change and the micropolitics of personal
relations, and to loosen all factional strangleholds upon the key societymaking resources
of political power, economic capital, and cultural authority.”252
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Each of these imagined futures has its own appeal and its own dangers.253 But I
am less interested in the pros and cons of these or any other imagined futures than in the
role of legal analysis in each. In particular, I want to suggest that a form of rationalizing
legal analysis is likely to emerge under any of Unger’s imagined futures. No matter what
the form or animating principles of a legal system, there will be disagreements about the
application of those principles to particular disputes. Those disputes will have to be
decided in some way, and the parties to those disputes will try to characterize the
governing law, whether it is statutory or constituted by previous decisions, in ways that
are favorable to the outcomes they desire. They will, in short, attempt to generate
doctrine from principle. One can imagine the parties to a dispute in a radical polyarchy
appealing to competing conceptions (or concepts) of what it really means to devolve
central state power to local communities, and one can imagine the legal scholars of such a
polyarchy poring over the resulting decision to determine its relationship with previous

253

This proposal is, at least, less frightening and more coherent than the

“destabilization rights” Unger once proposed; though one could imagine such rights
being an institutional feature of “mobilizational democracy.” See UNGER, CRITICAL
LEGAL STUDIES, supra note 202, at 52-56. For a brief but compelling critique of Unger’s
program of destabilization, see GALSTON, supra note 211, at 58-62.
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decisions. It will not be the form of the reasoning, but the normative principle under
which the reasoning occurs, that will differ.254
Imagine rationalizing legal analysis stripped of its claim to correctness. I submit
that this chastened form of “rationalizing legal analysis” would not differ significantly
from Unger’s preferred mode of reasoning by analogy, or indeed from the neo-pragmatic
position outlined in Parts II.C.3 and IV.D of this paper. The habits of “representing
extended pieces of law as expressions … of connected sets of policies and principles”, of
“making sense of [law] as a purposive social enterprise” and of “understand[ing] pieces
of law as fragments of an intelligible plan of social life”255 inevitably emerge from
anything more complex than a laundry list of cases; the impulse to abstraction is
inevitably engaged in reasoning by analogy; and the “arrest[ing] of the dialectic” reflects
the need for stability (perhaps only temporary) in legal matters. A commitment to justice,
in the minimal formal sense of treating like cases alike, is enough to generate all the
features of rationalizing legal analysis that Unger objects to, but does not eliminate the
analogical reasoning that Unger prizes.256 Indeed, rigorous exclusion of rationalizing
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In a similar vein, Andrew Halpin analyzes four of Unger’s proposed new rights

and shows that they have the same formal characteristics as the traditional rights Unger
objects to. See Andrew Halpin, New Rights for Old? 53 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 573 (1994).
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legal analysis from legal discourse would impoverish legal reasoning in much the same
way that the neo-formalist exclusion of policy argument does: it would bar the claim that
there was a recognizable normative pattern in a body of law.

D. Principled Consequentialism
Neo-formalist reasoning from principle cannot determine doctrine because there are
typically several doctrines consistent with any set of principles. Dworkin’s model of law
as integrity does not eliminate “ties” between possible legal doctrines in hard cases.
Economic analysis cannot determine doctrine because of the fundamental
indeterminacies in determining what is an economically efficient outcome and because of
the inherent normative limitations of the idea of economic efficiency. Critical Legal
Studies offers no new and improved picture of legal reasoning. Yet there is something
valuable in each of these approaches. The principles championed by the neo-formalists
speak to a deep sense of what it means for the law of a liberal state to respect persons.
Dworkin’s model provides a plausible account of the structure of legal decision-making,
even if it does not in itself support his claim that attention to rights can determine the
single correct answer in a hard case. Economic analysis of law, whatever its normative
shortcomings, is perhaps the most useful tool yet devised for predicting the effects of
legal doctrines on behavior. And the Critical Legal Scholars’ suspicious reading of legal
doctrine is sometimes justified: sometimes a claim to principle, neutrality, or reason is
indeed a mask for interest, partiality, and ideology; though sometimes it is not.257
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There is, I suggest, one theoretical attitude that accounts for the simultaneous
appeal and limitation of all of these perspectives. That attitude is pragmatism.
Philosophically, pragmatism stands for understanding concepts in terms of their practical
consequences,258 for understanding truth as a certain kind of usefulness,259 for thinking of
truth as the limit, or the result, of a process of inquiry rather than as the product of any
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JAMES, Pragmatism, supra note 12, at 506; MISAK, TRUTH, supra note 12, at

84-9; Zipursky, Pragmatic Conceptualism, supra note 13, at 471.
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JAMES, Pragmatism, supra note 12, at 512-520. Perhaps the weakest section

of Dworkin’s otherwise powerful account of law as integrity is the crude instrumentalism
he attributes to pragmatism; curiously, he cites no leading pragmatists in support of this
attribution: DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 7, at 151-175. Dworkin’s account of
law as integrity should appeal to pragmatists at least because of its insistence on the way
that past and current judicial decisions fit together: “ideas (which themselves are but
parts of our experience) become true just so far as they help us to get into satisfactory
relation with other parts of our experience ...” JAMES, Pragmatism, supra note 12, at
512, original emphasis. James’s pragmatism, though more instrumentalist than Pierce’s,
is far less crudely teleological than Dworkin supposes. For persuasive readings of
Dworkin as a pragmatist, see Steven D. Smith, The Pursuit of Pragmatism, 100 YALE L.J.
409 (1990); FISH, FREE SPEECH, supra note 2, at 224-230 (1993); see also Farber, supra
note 13, at 1345-6.
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method we already possess,260 for refusing to draw sharp methodological distinctions
between disciplines,261 for believing both that the world is really out there somewhere
and that our access to it is always mediated by concepts,262 and for taking all beliefs to be
in principle revisable.263 Legally, pragmatism stands for understanding doctrine in terms
of its uses, but without too much dogmatism about what those uses might be;264 for
thinking of principles as very abstract desiderata for the just treatment of individuals
rather than as axioms from which doctrines can be indisputably derived,265 for refusing to
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draw a sharp distinction between legal reasoning and other types of reasoning,266 and for
treating the law as a human phenomenon to be simultaneously understood and created.267
For the legal pragmatist, legal principles are neither the strict determinants of
doctrine nor mere instruments for the promotion of a comprehensive conception of the
good. Rather, legal principles are general statements about how the legal system should
treat people. We know they are valuable not only because they are supported at the most
abstract level by the idea that individual persons are of ultimate value, but also because of
our accumulated experience concerning how different ways of expressing these principles
in the form of specific legal doctrines has played out. Thus, while the legal pragmatist
does not expect that doctrine can be deduced from abstract principles, he or she is

266

“No bounds can be fixed a priori on what shall be allowed to count as an

argument in law.” POSNER, PROBLEMS, supra note 80, at 459. “I cannot think of a
characteristically legal reason that does not have a familiar analogue in common
experience and judgment.” GREENAWALT, supra note 268, at 199. “There is no such
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supra note 4, at 36. See also ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON, IT’S ALL IN THE GAME 151 (2000)
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prepared to rule out certain doctrines as gross violations of those principles, and to
entertain reasoned explanations of why one doctrine is more consistent with a principle
than another. The pragmatist does not expect these exercises to determine doctrine in
very many cases, and so is prepared to entertain argument as to the beneficial or harmful
consequences of adopting one doctrine rather than another. Because our social world is
pluralistic, and because the law is only one of many features of that world, the pragmatist
does not have to adopt a strongly teleological view or a comprehensive theory of the
good to think about consequences; he or she is content to consider those consequences
suggested by the legitimate legal purposes of the body of law in question.
This picture of pragmatic legal decision-making about doctrine is not particularly
novel. Some of its features may be reminiscent of certain features of other descriptions
of legal reasoning: it resembles what Greenawalt calls “the intuitive perspective of most
lawyers [and] … law teachers who concentrate on particular subject matters”268 as well as
MacCormick’s model of legal reasoning.269 It might be one of Rawls’s “mixed
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conceptions of justice”270 or Sunstein’s incompletely theorized agreements.271 Boyle’s
discussion of the role of integrity in a post-modern moral universe272 is pragmatic in
spirit, as is Radin’s interpretive reconstruction of the rule of law.273 To the extent that it
eschews strong methodological commitments, it is akin to Posner’s skepticism about
legal method,274 though it does not share the outright, even scornful, rejection of principle
that dominates his more recent contributions to jurisprudence.275 Structurally, it
resembles Chapman’s notion of conceptually sequenced argument,276 in that the demands
of principle are indeed prior to the consideration of consequences, though they are a
somewhat loose constraint on the consequences that count.
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The pragmatic view of legal decision-making has been criticized by contemporary
neo-formalists and neo-realists alike for this very lack of dogmatism: its ability to
accommodate any argument, its consistency with a wide range of political positions, and
its apparent moral emptiness.277 I suggest that pragmatism’s accommodating view of
argument should be seen as a strength, not a weakness, and that its morality is less empty
than the criticisms suppose. If pragmatism in philosophy is a view about truth, then
pragmatism in law is a view about the correctness of legal doctrine. 278 Like
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Ronald Dworkin, Pragmatism, Right Answers, and True Banality, in

PRAGMATISM IN LAW AND SOCIETY 359 (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds, 1991);
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Reflections on Nietzsche and Stendhal, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 85 (1996); Michael
Rosenfeld, Pragmatism, Pluralism and Legal Interpretation: Posner’s and Rorty’s
Justice Without Metaphysics Meets Hate Speech, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 97, 147-151
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philosophical pragmatism, legal pragmatism recognizes the human interests behind truth
claims; it does not provide any deductive procedure for determining correct legal
doctrines; and it takes experience to be an important indicator of which doctrine should
be adopted. It must therefore begin with some conception, perhaps a thin one, of the
human good to be promoted,279 and it must be catholic in its methodology. These

determine the precise nature of the relationship between philosophical and legal
pragmatism than to note their common attitude towards their tasks.
279

Dworkin takes this to be an objection to pragmatism rather than simply one of

its unavoidable features:
Pragmatists argue that any moral principle must be assessed only against a
practical standard: does adopting that principle help to make things better? But if
they stipulate any particular social goal—any conception of when things are
better—they undermine their claim, because that social goal could not itself be
justified instrumentally without arguing in a circle.
Dworkin, Darwin’s New Bulldog, supra note 35, at 1735. This criticism is unjustified.
In any instrumental argument, the goal to be pursued cannot itself be justified by the
instruments used to pursue it; but all this shows is that instrumental arguments are
incomplete in themselves, not that they undermine themselves. Problems arise with
instrumental reason not because the means do not justify the ends, but because means and
ends cannot in general be neatly isolated from each other. See PUTNAM, REALISM, supra
note 12, at 163-78; Stewart, Critique, supra note 79, at 62-74. But pragmatism is far
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strengths are illustrated by the discussion of tort and crime in Part III above: where the
neo-formalist approach seems to demand a particular doctrinal result, without any
sensitivity to the consequences of adopting that doctrinal result, and where the neo-realist
denies that the doctrinal result has anything to do with principle, the pragmatist connects
the doctrinal result to the principle through a process that takes into account the effects on
the social world of adopting the doctrine.
To illustrate the approach that principled consequentialism would take to a
particular legal problem, I return, once again, to the issue of the fault requirement for the
offense of sexual assault, where the actus reus element at issue is the complainant’s lack
of consent. There are many possibilities. At one extreme, the accused might be judged
solely in terms of his own world view; that is, the prosecution might be required to prove
not only that the accused was aware of the complainant’s lack of consent but that he
knew it was wrong to proceed with sexual contact in the face of absence of consent.280
At the other extreme, the prosecution might not be required to prove anything at all about

better at taking account of these means-ends interactions than either pure instrumentalism
or neo-formalism because it keeps instrumentalism in its proper place, as the servant, and
not the enemy or the master, of our efforts to find a satisfactory form of life. See, for
example, PUTNAM, PRAGMATISM, supra note 12, at 73-74.
280

All legal systems that I am aware of would treat the accused’s claim as a

mistake of law that was irrelevant to culpability, but at this point in the analysis, I do not
want to take this possible fault requirement off the table merely by referring to another
legal doctrine.
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the accused’s mental attitude towards the complainant’s consent.281 A principled
consequentialist would take these two extremes to be impermissible on grounds of
principle alone. The hyper-subjective, accused-centered perspective on the interaction
simply fails to take the complainant seriously as a person and fails to recognize the wrong
done when the accused treats her merely as a thing. But the strict liability approach,
requiring no demonstration of fault whatsoever, is equally inconsistent with principle in
that it fails to attend in any serious way to the accused’s exercise of agency, that is, to the
accused’s reasons for acting as he did, and thus permits the state to treat the accused as
something less than a person.
But between these two extremes, there are several possible fault standards. The
law might adopt the usual criminal requirement of knowledge, so that the prosecution
would have to prove that the accused was aware of the complainant’s lack of consent. Or
a more objective model of fault might be adopted. Perhaps the prosecution should be
required to prove only that a reasonable person would have been aware of the
complainant’s lack of consent, or that the accused failed to exercise due diligence to
ascertain consent. How should a legal decision-maker choose between these alternatives?
Consider the following two opposed arguments concerning the mens rea requirement
with respect to the complainant’s lack of consent, one favoring the subjective standard,
the other favoring an objective standard:

Rape is a crime requiring mens rea.

281
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Mens rea means intention or recklessness.
If the man believes that the woman is consenting he does not intend to rape, and is
not reckless.
Therefore even an unreasonable belief [in consent] negatives liability.282

There can be no doubt that it is a major harm for a woman to be subjected to nonconsensual sexual intercourse notwithstanding that the man may believe he has
her consent. There can be little doubt that the cost of taking reasonable care is
insignificant with the harm which can be avoided through its exercise: indeed, the
only cost I can identify is the general one of creating some additional pressure
towards greater explicitness in sexual contexts. To accept an honest but
unreasonable belief in consent as a sufficient answer in these circumstances is to
countenance the doing of a major harm that could have been avoided at no
appreciable cost. Therefore, [a mistaken belief in consent should be reasonable to
be a defense to rape].283
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The first argument, with its deductive structure and its resolution of a doctrinal problem
on the basis of a fairly abstract idea about criminal liability, sounds like a classic
argument of principle. The second, with its appeal to the harm of rape and to the costs
and benefits of the proposed doctrine, sounds like a classic argument of policy. But
principled legal reasoning — and, in particular, the requirement that the law treat both the
complainant and the accused as responsible agents — is simply too abstract to determine
the choice between these two alternatives. Both of them recognize the role of each party
to the interaction; they simply place different burdens on the parties. For the principled

fault standard for sexual assault, or “the rule in Pappajohn”, supra note 282, has been
modified by statute: see CRIMINAL CODE, R.S.C., Chap. C-46, §273.2 (1985); the
modification was held to be constitutionally valid in R. v. Darrach, 38 O.R.3d 1 (1998).
The Supreme Court has not expressly overruled Pappajohn, but held in R. v. Ewanchuk,
[1999] 1 S.C.R. 330, that to negate mens rea, a mistaken belief in consent must be a
belief that the complainant has communicated consent by words or conduct. This
holding, combined with §273.2 of the Criminal Code, in my view effectively imposes a
reasonableness requirement on the defense of mistaken belief in consent. For further
discussion of the relationship between these changes in the law and Canadian
constitutional doctrine concerning fault for criminal offenses, see Stewart, Step Forward,
supra note 107; HAMISH STEWART, SEXUAL OFFENCES IN CANADIAN LAW ¶3:600 (2004)
[hereinafter STEWART, SEXUAL OFFENCES].
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consequentialist, it is legitimate to consider the probable consequences of adopting one
doctrine over the other in choosing between them.
If, for example, there were empirical evidence suggesting that an objective fault
element would better deter sexual misconduct or would promote more respectful
behavior in sexual relationships, such evidence would count in favor of the objective fault
requirement. The suggestion in the second quotation that the costs to men of checking
for consent are trivial compared with the benefits to women would also count in favor of
an objective model of fault. The argument may have an economic aspect to it,284 but is
not founded on the normative considerations that normally inform economic analysis.
The claim is not that adopting an objective fault requirement would make society as a
whole better off in terms of some aggregate of wealth or welfare, but that the interests
specifically protected by the law of sexual assault — everyone’s interest in both freedom
to act and in bodily security in respect of sexual contact — would be better protected by
the objective standard.
On the other hand, if the empirical evidence pointed the other way, or if (contrary
to the actual situation in all jurisdictions that I am aware of) sexual assault were a very
rare social occurrence, it might be appropriate to adopt the subjective standard simply on
the basis of the usual grounds for having subjective fault in criminal law. In short, the
point of the example is not to resolve the doctrinal question, but to show how principled
consequentialism excludes some answers while leaving others open, and to show how it

284

Compare Parker, supra note 177, at 783-5.

132

Principled Consequentialism

[2007]

permits both the appeal to consequences, which neo-formalist principled reasoning is
often taken to forbid, and the appeal to principle, which neo-realist approaches exclude.

V.

DETERMINACY AND LEGITIMACY

The claim that the law provides determinate answers based on principle alone is often
connected with a certain type of claim about legitimacy. This claim runs roughly as
follows. Legitimacy depends upon the rule of law, not the rule of men and women. The
rule of law requires that the answer to a hard case “does not depend on something
idiosyncratic about the person who is deciding, or on controversial moral and political
claims that are the stuff of debate in the legislative process.”285 Therefore, the rule of law
and legitimacy both require that the law provide determinate answers.286
Neo-formalists and neo-realists generally accept this argument, but draw different
conclusions from it. For the neo-formalists, the argument shows the need to adopt a
model of legal reasoning that renders doctrine reasonably determinate; for the neo-realist,
the argument shows that the legitimacy of law must be rooted in something other than
determinate doctrinal answers based on principle. One branch of Critical Legal
scholarship accepts this argument, but argues that it shows the impossibility of the rule of
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law. The law does not provide determinate answers; therefore, the rule of law, conceived
of as the rule of neutral principle, is not possible; therefore, the law is not legitimate.287
Another branch of Critical Legal scholarship concedes that something like the rule of law
is a nice idea, even if it is cannot exist in the form posited by contemporary liberals.288
If doctrinal determinacy is not possible, then there is not much point in making
law’s claim to legitimacy depend upon it. But the observation that doctrine is not
determinate does not in itself eliminate the rule of law. If it were the case that we had
simply no idea what would happen in any case, even without factual dispute, there would
indeed be a problem of legitimacy; if it were the case that the judge’s personality was the
decisive factor in every case, there would again be a problem of legitimacy. The
pragmatic view asserts that principles provide some boundaries for possible answers in
hard cases, and that all sorts of policy considerations may properly inform the choice of
doctrine. In this model, there is no escape from the possibility that the identity of the
judge289 or the quality of the parties’ advocates may have some effect on the outcome. On
what basis can it claim legitimacy?
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the United States on the ground that they had erroneous theories of constitutional
adjudication. See DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 7, at 265-320; Ronald
Dworkin, Judge Roberts on Trial, 52/16 NEW YORK REV. BOOKS 14 (Oct. 20, 2005);
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First, the pragmatic view asserts that the result in the great run of cases is
reasonably predictable.290 Some degree of certainty about outcomes is part of what
makes a legal system legitimate. Second, and far more important, by admitting a wide
range of arguments into the determination of a hard case, the pragmatic view aspires to a
more democratic model of the judicial process than that of the contemporary liberal. The
traditional liberal legitimating move has been to exclude forms of argument from legal
argument: Dworkin’s principle/policy distinction excludes arguments seeking to show the
good or bad effects on collective goals that a legal doctrine is likely to have; Rawls’s
political liberalism excludes reference to comprehensive moral positions in legal
argument; Ripstein’s neo-formalism excludes arguments based on conceptions of the
good altogether. The pragmatic legitimating move is rather to include forms of
argument, to say that, at least in hard cases, almost anything goes.291
The pragmatic approach thus reduces the distinction between legal reasoning and
other forms of practical reasoning, while contemporary liberals seek to draw a fairly
sharp distinction, and the Critics, at least in their more extreme moods, deny the
possibility of legal reasoning altogether. For the contemporary neo-formalists, legal

Ronald Dworkin, The Strange Case of Judge Alito, 53/3 NEW YORK REV. BOOKS 14
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reasoning is distinctive because of its basis in principle, where principle is understood as
the refusal to hear arguments about the moral, political, economic, or other effects of a
legal doctrine on the achievement of some conception of the good. Many contemporary
liberals urge us to leave these arguments to the legislative sphere;292 though on a strict
neutralist liberal view, it is doubtful whether they belong there either.293 But even some
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See, e.g., DWORKIN, PRINCIPLE, supra note 7, at 181-204.
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Rawls considers two views about the extent to which underlying moral values

may enter public reason. According to the “exclusive view … on fundamental political
matters, reasons given explicitly in terms of comprehensive doctrines are never to be
introduced into public reason.” According to the “inclusive view … citizens [may], in
certain situations, ... present what they regard as the basis of political values rooted in
their comprehensive doctrine, provided they do this in ways that strengthen the ideal of
public reason itself.” RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra note 7, at 247. While the exclusive
view may seem truer to the spirit of Rawls’s enterprise, he chooses the inclusive view
because it is more likely “to further the ideal of public reason.” Id. at 248. The
constraints of public reason apply to legislative decisions: id. at 252, 337-340. A
comprehensive position “includes conceptions of what is of value in human life, and
ideals of personal character, as well as ideals of friendship and of familial and
associational relationships, and much else that is to inform our conduct, and in the limit
to our life as a whole.” Id. at 13. Therefore, in Rawls’s view, arguments from
comprehensive positions are admissible only where they are advanced not for their own
sake but for the sake of public reason itself. It is not clear how this constraint could ever
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contemporary liberals doubt whether a sharp distinction between legal and other forms of
reasoning can be upheld;294 and, if legal reasoning is distinct, it is certainly hard to
understand the common practice of hearing from intervenors in constitutional litigation
and other hard cases.
Indeed, I would argue that the exclusion of appeals to consequences, and therefore
of appeals to conceptions of the good, does not support but undermines the legitimacy of
decision-making in hard cases because it excludes almost all the reasons one might have
for changing from one doctrine to another. Without appeal to consequences, one is left
with appeals to principles, which do not themselves determine legal doctrine.
The principal reason for excluding appeals to the good is the fear that permitting
appeals to the good will result in rights being overridden in the pursuit of the good. This
is a real fear, to the extent that we believe that rights have either intrinsic or instrumental
value, but attempting to insulate the content of rights from debate by excluding appeals to
consequences is not the answer; rather, one must have, as Dyzenhaus puts it, a

be observed in practice, and whether Rawls’s adoption of the inclusive view is not
inconsistent with the limited role that comprehensive positions are supposed to play. See
also DYZENHAUS, supra note 214, at 226-227.
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“democratic trust in deliberation,”295 a hope that legal actors, and citizens in general, will
remain capable of recognizing that rights are part of what make liberal societies good to
live in.296 In any event, if people do not recognize that, nothing will protect us from the
infringement of rights.
To illustrate these points, I return, for the last time, to an example I have used
above. Suppose an appellate court has to determine the fault requirement for the offense
of sexual assault. The trial court has found that the victim did not consent to the
accused’s sexual conduct, but that the accused honestly believed she had consented. On
appeal, the legal issue is the appropriate fault element for sexual assault. Assume that the
law on the point is not clear: to use Greenawalt’s terms, it is not the case that “virtually
any lawyer or other intelligent person familiar with the legal system would conclude,
after careful study, that the law provides [an] answer.”297 The answer may be unclear
because the offense is defined at common law and the precise point has never arisen;298
or because the statute does not define the fault element;299 or because the case law
contains competing interpretations of a statutory definition; or because the constitutional
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validity of the statutory definition is in issue.300 Consider four possible answers to the
question. (i) The accused’s honest belief that he did not, as a matter of law, require
consent negates liability (hyper-subjective fault). On this model, the accused would have
to be acquitted. (ii) The accused’s honest belief in consent negates liability (subjective
fault). On this model, the accused would again have to be acquitted. (iii) The accused’s
honest belief in consent negates liability only if it was reasonable (objective fault), or the
accused’s honest belief negates liability only if he took some steps to investigate the
victim’s consent (due diligence model of fault).301 On these models, a verdict could not
be rendered without further factual findings relating to the accused’s exercise of due
diligence. (iv) The accused’s belief in consent, honest or otherwise, is irrelevant: if the
complainant did not consent, the accused is guilty whatever his beliefs about consent
(absolute or strict liability). On this model, the accused would have to be convicted.
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to, the objective liability model, on the ground that a reasonable person would make some
inquiries. I distinguish them because the “reasonable steps” requirement under the
Canadian Criminal Code has struck many judges and commentators as being different
from a straight reasonableness requirement, though there is disagreement about which is
more stringent. See Stewart, Step Forward, supra note 107, at 22 n. 41; STEWART,
SEXUAL OFFENCES, supra note 283, at ¶3:600.30.20.
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As argued above,302 principled argument from liberal premises about human
agency excludes the first and fourth solutions. The first fails to take the complainant
seriousl as a person, while the fourth fails to take the accused’s agency seriously. The
choice among the remaining doctrines depends on some assessment of the relative
importance of freedom of action and sexual autonomy. Contemporary neo-formalists
may agree so far; indeed, Ripstein claims that his approach dictates a unique choice of
doctrine on this basis, and I have criticized his claim above. But a court might also
consider the empirical effectiveness of the various doctrines in controlling sexual assault;
this sort of argument is excluded from the neo-formalist approach to determining the fault
element. But an American or Canadian appellate court hearing such a case today is likely
to hear from a variety of intervenors who will direct argument at these very questions.
Specifically, feminist interest groups are likely to intervene and to argue in favor of an
objective fault element. A feminist intervener will likely point out that even if sexual
assault is defined in gender neutral terms, the vast majority of offenders are men and a
somewhat smaller majority of victims are women; that the fear of being sexually
assaulted has a peculiarly constraining effect on women’s behavior; that the subjective
model of culpability serves only to reinforce men’s bad attitudes about women’s sexual
availability; and that the objective model requires men to attend to women’s expressions
of non-consent in a way that the subjective model does not.303 These arguments, if
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accepted, provide good reasons to adopt doctrine (ii) or doctrine (iii). But note that they
fall outside the range of principled arguments that a neo-formalist could accept because
they are empirical claims founded on the desire to promote a partial vision of what makes
a society good: a certain conception of proper relationships between men and women and
of the attitudes that men should take up towards women.
Now, which form of legal decision-making has more legitimacy? The principled
model which neither agrees nor disagrees with the feminist intervenor but refuses to hear
her at all? Or the pragmatic model which recognizes her arguments as relevant to a
decision which cannot be made on a purely principled basis in any event? To ask the
question (as the judges say) is to answer it: legitimacy in doctrinal determination depends
not merely on the determinacy of the outcome, but also on the range of voices heard in
the process. Pragmatism creates room for those voices without denying the role principle
in limiting the range of possible solutions.304
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CONCLUSION

This article recommends that legal decision-makers see themselves as pragmatic in the
sense of trying to do some good within a framework of principle. This recommendations
flows both from the inherent attractiveness of pragmatism itself and from the unviability
of the alternatives. The recommendation that legal decision-makers act purely on the
dictates of principle, in its neo-formalist guise, cannot be followed because the dictates of
principle are rarely, if ever, sufficiently specific to determine doctrine. The neo-realist or
Critical observation that principled arguments and decisions all too often mask operations
of power and ideology is useful for making liberals uncomfortable, but as yet has offered
legal decision-makers nothing at all in the way of useful advice. The relentless
instrumentalism of some practitioners of economic analysis of law is necessarily
incomplete because of the limited normative claims that can be made on the basis of
modern economic analysis. Pragmatism offers the following thought: we can combine
principles and consequences by asking of any doctrine, in light of the relevant legal
materials and purposes, the following questions: is it consistent with the relevant
governing principles? If so, does it do any good? Compared with the ambitions of some
legal theorists, these questions may seem modest indeed; but they should be enough.

